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The problem of competing theories ~n psychology pre-
sents major difficulties for the practicing psycho-
therapist. These difficulties have traditionally 
been addressed in monotheoretical, eclectic and inte-
grative approaches. This work critically examines the 
problems associated with these traditional methods. 
It draws on the philosophy of complementarity as 
postulated by Niels Bohr in order to develop an alter-
native approach. This philosophy stresses the indeter-
minate nature of the object of study in psychology, 
and therefore holds that it is necessary to .entertain 
multiple perspectives. It also holds that in order 
to counteract the problem of indeterminism there is 
a need for clarity of theoretical descriptions. For 
psychotherapy practice this implies, in contradistinction 
to eclecticism, the separate rather than mixed use of 
diverse approaches. The practical options suggested 
by therapeutic complementarity are outlined and their 
benefits are discussed. 
1 
INTRODUCTION 




A CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT FOR THE STUDY 
The objective of this introductory section is to state in 
broad outline the aim, central themes and philosophical bias 
of the thesis. In addition, basic terminology will be defined. 
A central argument to be developed by this work is that scien-
tific endeavour should occur in a systematic way within a 
clearly defined conceptual context. In accordance with the 
above principle, the introduction sets out to provide such a 
context. 
( i) AH1 AND RATIONALE 
The aim of this thesis is to propose the philosophy of com-
plementarity as a framework for clarification of the problem 
of multiple theories in the practice of psychotherapy. Rychlak 
(1968, 1981) has identified two major strategies of theorizing 
in the history of science which are evident in psychology. 
·' ) •( ( 
'' 
One is the dialectical tradition which stresses the active role 
of the mind in which meanings are generated. It bears the 
characteristics of subjectivity, relationality, contradiction 
and arbitrariness. The other is the demonstrative line of 
reasoning which starts with the assumption that there are items 
of information that can be taken at the outset to be primary 
and true, and not open to alternatives. Demonstrative meaning 
bears the characteristics of objectivity, singularity, uni-
directionality and non-contradiction. All psychological theories 
are involved in activities that tend to place them on one or 
other side of this oppositional dimension. 
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Rychlak suggests that the problem of how best to resolve the 
diversity of psychological theory in practice is the single most 
important question for the discipline to answer. Lambley 
(1971) corroborates Rychlak's view, stressing the particular 
importance of this problem in relation to psychotherapy. He 
notes that the psychotherapist is faced with a multiplicity 
of psychological theories, each with a different account of 
his client's behaviour and mode of resolving his client's 
problems. Continuously the therapist is called upon to make 
decisions concerning his action in the face of this situation. 
The nature of the action he takes has crucial relevance for 
his ability to offer an effective and therefore ethical service. 
The ability to offer an ethical service in psychology, however, 
is particularly difficult because of the discipline's theoretical 
confusion (Rychlak, 1968). Rychlak's opinion is shared by many 
others (Siegler, 1966; Koch, 1969; Coulter, 1973; Kovel, 
1976; Stiles, 1979; Chessick, 1982; Goldfried, 1983), who 
indicate that the science of psycho~h,e~apy is faced wi~h~an 
epistemiological problem at the interface between theory and 
practice of crisis proportions. This work is an attempt to 
address some of the issues involved in this crisis. Clearly 
it is beyond the scope of the work to provide a total resolution 
of these issues and it is therefore necessary to clarify the 
manner in which the problem will be approached. 
The objective is not by means of complementarity to produce a 
new general approach which will rid psychology of multiple 
theories. Nor does it suggest final answers to the therapist 
regarding a particular choice of theories. Its contribution 
is to provide an epistemology (theory of knowledge) in the form 
of complementarity, which helps us to understand why there 
are multiple accounts of human behaviour. It argues that this 
state of affairs will always prevail in psychology and it 
implies certain principles with regard to the psychotherapist's 
activities in practice. 
The complementarity thesis originated in the early 1900's as 
a resolution to the wave/particle competing theories dilemma 
encountered by physicists in the study of light. The relevance 
of this particular conceptual development in the physical 
sciences as an epistemology for psychology was clearly anti-
cipated by Bohr (1958), the originator of the philosophy, as 
well as by Jung (Adler, 1975, p.308) and more recently with 
specific reference to psychotherapy by Chessick (1977, 1982). 
In spite of the important indications by these authors of an 
idea worthy of further investigation in psychology, this task 
has never been systematically addressed. 
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As suggested earlier, every system of knowledge has a position 
on one or other side of two fundamental strategies of theorizing, 
the dialecti~al versus the demonstrative. Complementarity is 
n~ exception to this ~~le and has its roots firmly on the 
q~~lectical side of this oppositional dimension. The justifi-
cation for the adoption of this particular bias is that it is 
in line with the most recent developments in the philosophy of 
science (Russell, 1979; Ingleby, 1981; Siegel, 1982; Williams, 
1983). Philosophers of science have been influenced by the 
wave/particle developments in Quantum Physics and in order to 
explain them have moved into more dialectical and less demon-
strative understandings of the nature of knowledge. 
Authors such as Harre (1979), Shetter (1975) and Rychlak (1968, 
1982) have paid attention to the developments in modern physics 
as having philosophical implications for psychology. They 
have used these developments, however, to buttress arguments 
for psychological theories which are more dialectical and less 
demonstrative in nature. What these authors have not done is 
to use the recent philsosphical developments in physics to 
stand outside the discipline and make an overall analysis of 
psychology as a science. There are authors who have stood 
outside and commented on the science from a demonstrative stand-
point (e.g. Koch, 1969; Hebb, 1974). ·These authors have 
typically come to the conclusion that because of its diverse 
theories, psychology can never be a coherent science. The 
dialectical analysis to be promoted here claims that such a 
nihilistic point of view is unnecessary. Complementarity 
gives epistemological coherence to the science of microphysics 
in spite of its theoretical diversity, and it can do the same 
for psychology. It is this move that is necessary in order to 
provide an overall guide to the practice of psychotherapy. 
A recent comprehensive review of attempts to cope with multiple 
approaches in psychotherapy (Goldfried, 1982) leaves the reader 
in no doubt that an all-encompassing philosophical principle 
of the type envisaged here which can be logically linked to 
psychotherapeutic practice is not being used. Goldfried has 
not made use of any organizing yardstick apart from an historical 
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one in order to derive order out of the vast contribution to 
the literature on what he calls therapeutic integration. This 
leaves the reader flounderirig with no .clear sense of direction. 
'Therapeutic integration' is the umbrella term used in the 
recent literature to encompass the entire range of pragmatic 
approaches to the multiple modes problem (Goldfried, 1982; 
Garfield, 1982; Kendall, 1982; Wachtel, 1982). 
The principles derived from the philosophy of complementarity 
will be used as a framework to differentiate between these 
various approaches in a three-pronged re-definition of thera-
peutic terms as follows: 
(1) integration meaning synthesis, 
(2) eclecticism meaning the unsynthesized mixing of models, and 
(3) tEerapeutic complementarity meaning the use of diverse 
models but in a theoretically distinct way. 
Those pragmatic trends in the literature that fit the criteria 
of therapeutic complementarity need to be separated from the 
over-inclusive and ad hoc mixtures of integration and eclec-
ticism which, it is felt, contribute to confusion in the practice 
of psychotherapy. This work will give identity to the more 
favourable approach of therapeutic complementarity which prom-
ises decreased confusion for psychotherapy because of epistemo-
logical roots which dictate conceptual clarity. 
(ii) DEFINITION OF TERMS: CLASSIFICATION, THEORY, METATHEORY, 
EPISTEMOLOGY 
7 
At this point, it is necessary to clarify some basic terminology. 
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It has been found useful to differentiate between two types of 
organizing principle in science viz. (1) classification and (2) 
theory (cf Losee, 1972; The Oxford Illustrated Dictionary, 
1975). (1) Classification is defined as the arranging in 
classes aspects of knowledge about a phenomenon. The class-
ifier or taxonomist is able to isolate the generic and diff-
erentiating aspects of a phenomenon and it is in this sense 
that organization and clarification are achieved. This level 
of organization is purely descriptive and does not have the 
power to explain events or deductively to propose future events. 
(2) Theory, on the other hand, is defined as a co-ordinated 
system of ideas which accounts for origins and reasons. By 
means of interpretation rather than pure description it attempts 
to isolate something essential in the phenomenonon. It can 
serve therefore as an organizing format from which logically 
to deduce future events. 
Now philosophy constitutes theorizing about a particular type 
of subject matter (it theorizes about the ultimate nature and 
most general causes and principles of things) and belongs 
therefore to the second class of organizing principles as out-
lined above. It is evident that in considering the problematic 
phenomenon to be addressed by this thesis that the level of 
theory should have an advantage as an organizing principle over 
that of classification. It should provide not only clarification 
-' 
of the situation by means of its interpretation of the situation, 
but enable also the logical deduction of future procedural 
patterns according to the guid~ng principles of its particular 
formula. What is being proposed for this thesis therefore 
is a theory (the philosophy of complementarity), which will 
stand outside the framework of any of the current psychological 
theories in order to comment upon them. Such an analysis is 
known as a metatheory. It should be noted that the word 
'meta' is a Greek prefix for 'about' (Dictionary of Philosophy, 
1979), and the word metatheory simply means 'about theories'. 
A metatheory therefore can have. but does not necessarily have. 
the status of theory itself. 
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It has been important to be explicit about the type of organizing 
principle being promoted in this thesis because a basis has 
now been provided foracomparison between. analyses of the multi-
theoretical problem. This thesis will develop an argument 
that the limitation of other central metatheoretical analyses 
(e.g. Rychlak, 1968 and Royce, 1970) is that they tend not to 
have the status of theory and therefore lack explanatory 
power for procedural direction at the practical level. An 
exception to this worthy of note is Lambley (1971) who pro-
poses an existential theory which gives the psychotherapist, 
faced with diverse theories, a choice of action by understanding 
his value dilemma. Lambley makes logical deductions for 
practice from his theoretical position and argues for a plu~al~ 
istic approach in the form of eclecticism. As noted earlier,, 
whilst complementarity favours a pluralistic diversity of 
approaches it is against an ad hoc mixture, and therefore in 
contrast to Lambley' s position, provides a strong argument 
against eclecticism. Paradoxically the unifying resolution 
offered by the philosophy of complementarity at the meta-
theoretical level, is for the acceptance and promotion of 
diversity and separateness at the theoretical level. 
A further point of clarification in order to avoid confusion 
due to terminology is to mention.philosophies of,science for 
I 
psychology which do not have the status of an all-encompassing 
metatheory of psychology (e.g. Feifel, 1964; Rychlak, 1968; 
Giorgi, 1970; Shatter, 1975; De Waele and Harr~, 1976; 
Harr~, 1 9 79) . As mentioned previously, when Rychlak (1968) 
\ 
presents a philosophy of science for psychology, he is with 
these other authors, promoting one philosophical tradition 
(the dialectic) as an.alternative to another philosophical 
tradition (the demonstrative) within psychology. This should 
not be confused with the philosophy of psychological science 
being promoted in this thesis. Complementarity is a meta-
philosophy in terms of these two traditions since its purpose 
is, by standing outside of them, to seek clarification precisely 
on the problem of this historically irreducible and contradic-
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tory split, as well as on all the multiple splits between psycho-
logical theories which Rychlak has classified as tending to fall 
on one or other side of these two traditions. 
The branch of philosophical endeavour within which complemen-
tarity falls, and by means of which it will provide such clar-
ification on.the whole of psychological science, is that of 
epistemology, i.e.'· that branch of philosophy concerned with 
elucidating the nature, derivation and scope of knowledge. 
Epistemology is not interested in particular beliefs. It in-
vestigates rather the ground~ for various beliefs. It is for 
this reason that complementarity does not have the capacity to 
comment. on a particular choice of theory, but does have the 
capacity to comment .on the nature of the theories themselves 
I I 
and the way in which they contribute to our knowledge. 
In: sum the philosophy of complementarity provides a metatheor.,.. 
etical analysis of psychological science since it stands out-
side of all psychological theories and comments upon ·them. 
The nature of its commentary is epistemological since it pre-
sents a system which explains fundamental aspects concerning 
the derivation of scientific knowledge. As an explanatory 
system it has the status of theory and has the potential 
therefore to act as a reference point from which logical de-
ductions can be made with regard to practice. 
(iii) THE RELEVANCE OF PHILOSOPHY. TO PSYCHOLOGY 
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Finally, since the aim of this thesis is to introduce a 
philosophy for clarification of problematic issues in the science, · 
certain questions need to be answered concerning the nature 
of philosophy and its relationship and·relevance to psychology. 
Ayer (1976) views philosophy and all the sciences as consti-
tut.ing different ends of a conceptual-empirical continuum res-
pectively. Philosophy, in other words, tends to be conceptual 
and empirically unverifiable; science tends to be c6ncerned 
with speculations which strive towards empirical verification. 
The important point that Ayer wishes to make with his continuum 
idea, is that it is absurd to propose that either science 
or philosophy can exist without aspects of the other. 
Philosophical problems (i.e. conceptual 'problems which cannot 
be resolved empirically)· are assumed in any science (Harre, 1974) 
and it is essential therefore in every science, and especially 
in a less advanced science such as psychology (Ayer, 1976), 
for philosophy to bring light onto the presuppositions of the 
science. The presuppositions will be logically involved in 
the application of the method and, therefore, in spite of the 
analysis of these pre-suppositions taking place at a very·high 
level of abstraction, it will be able to shed light on the 
practice of the method. Block. (1979, p.457) sees the role of 
philosophy in psychology as 'allowing psychologists to see the 
landscape in a clear-headed way'. Conceptual confusions, he 
argues, 'utterly vitiate psychologists' work. .Feifel (1,969, 
p.419) states that "as long as we worship science and are 
afraid of philosophy we shall have no great science." 
A problem arises in that whil'st philosophy and science are on 
a continuum conceptually, they constitute two separate discip-
lines in practice with emphases on different academic skills. 
It is psychologists, however, and not philosophers who are in 
the best position to make the necessary conceptual analyses to 
resolve serious conceptual confusions in their own science. 
Block (1981) states the argument as follows: 
Normally, the scientists themselves solve 
conceptual problems in science. Although 
the skills involved are of the sort in which 
philosophers are trained (and in which 
scientists are typically not trained), only 
those at the frontiers of scientific know-
ledge are in a position to see the issues 
with the requisite degree of clarity. 
( p. 1 ) 
12 
In conclusion, the position with regard to philosophy and 
psychology can be summarised as follows: (1) Philosophy is 
the vital tool for clarification of serious conceptual con-
fusions in science, and therefore as long as we exclude 
philosophical analysis there will be no progress. (2) It is 
the psychologist and not a pure philosopher who is needed to 
make this philosophical analysis because it is only he who 
has sufficient knowledge of the discipline to elaborate fully 
on the implications. Philosopher/physicist Niels Bohr was only 
in a position to suggest the relevance of complementarity to 
psychology, it remains for a psychologist to embark on the in-
depth and complex task of exploring these implications further. 
(iv) THESIS PLAN 
The arguments contained in this work are presented in three 
major sections which are divided up as follows. 
Section 1 is concerned with a detailed examination of the 
problem of diverse approaches to psychotherapy and consequent 
difficulties regarding treatment. The first sub-section ana-
lyses the situation from an epistemological point of. view. 
The second sub-section identifies fundamental problem areas and 
critically examines some central meta-theroetical perspectives 
on these pro~lems. 
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Section 2 proposes the philosophy of complementarity as a 
metatheoretical alternative which can answer the epistemological 
dilemma in psychology in a way that has not previously been done. 
It includes an examination of the history and philosophy of 
complementarity and a critical assessment of its suitability 
as a philosophy of psychological science. This section goes 
on to develop the notion that complemen.tarity is a psycho-
c--~ ~-· 
..... --·· 
loJical di~~ectical concept in essence and makes use of psycho-
logical theories from Jung and Kelly to elaborate on the com-
plementarity theme. 
The final section is devoted to practice alternatives for 
psychotherapy examined against the framework of complemen-
tarity. It provides a re-definition of therapeutic terms and 
critically discusses the alternatives of '~ntegration', 
1 eclecticism' and 1 therapeutic complementarity'·. 
(v) SUMMARY 
This introductory section has stated the aim, central themes 
and bias of the thesis. A rationale has been provided for 
the development of complementarity as a philosophy of psycho-
logical science to act as an overall guidein the practice of 
psychotherapy. Complementarity. is a dialectical viewpoint 
which gives epistemological coherence to diverse psychological 
theories. From its principles, a pluralistic, anti-eclectic 
position will be argued for psychotherapy. 
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SECTION 1 
DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM 
SECTION I 
DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM 
The aim of this section is to examine the issue of multiple 
approaches to psychotherapy in detail. Metatheoretical solu-
tions to the problem of diverse psychological theories will 
be reviewed in terms of their implications for the practice 
of psychotherapy. 
1.1 THE PROBLEM OF DIVERSE APPROACHES TO PSYCHOTHERAPY 
For the purposes of this thesis the term 'psychotherapy' is 
used generically to encompass all the procedures by which 
therapists apply psychological techniques derived from esta-
blishedpsychological principles to ameliorate emotional or be-
havioural problems of various kinds. Behaviour theories and 
techniques which have traditionally been differentiated from 
'psychotherapy' are included under the term when it is used 
as it is here in its broadest sense (Strupp, 1978). 
Strupp (1978) isolates two major issues of relevance to psycho-
therapy which he states as follows: 
• 
The major issues in psychotherapy relate 
to what is to be changed and how·change can 
be brought about. The first part of the 
question entails definition of the problem 
for which the patient is seeking help 
(depression, marital difficul~ies, shyness, 
~ nailbiting, sexual dysfunction, existential 
anxiety, etc.); the second pertains to the 
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process and techniques by means of which 
change is effected (support, ventilation of 
feelings, interpretations, systematic de-
sensitization, assertiveness training, etc.) 
(p. 4) 
The major issue which concerns us here and which encompasses 
the above two issues is the conceptual basis for the 'what' 
and 'how' of the problem to be changed. The emotional or 
behavioural problem is understood from a particular conceptual 
basis (i.e. theoretical orientation), and this orientation also 
determines the method of treatment. Even if at a very un-
sophisticated level a technique or method of action always 
lies to some extent within a theoretical orientation (Kovel, 
1976; Williams, 1983; Heaton, 1979). In other words, 
theory and practice are necessarily interwoven. 
Since diverse psychological theories exist, psychotherapy is 
characterised by multiple theoretical approaches for under----
standing the patient's problem and the means by which 
change can be effected (e.g. psychoanalytic, analytic, exis-
tential, Rogerian, gestalt and behavioural approaches). These 
various orientations can occur in several different modes 
1 7 
(e.g. individual, family, marital and group_~pproaches). And there 
- ~ ·- ..... ---- .... 
are theoretical orientations which are specific to particular 
modes (e.g. Minuchin' s family therapy) . A single theoretical orientation 
does ·not necessarily imply a single method of treatment, but 
can include diverse approaches within the orientation to deal 
with the same problem (e.g. systematic desensitization, model-
' 
ling and flooding are alternative techniques within behaviour 
theory for the treatment of a phobia). 
In short, with all these possible combinations, a multiplicity 
of approaches to psychotherapy have sprung up each with 
their own grossly di~ergent blaims, truths and fundamental 
ideologies. The nature of these claims in some cases come 
from systematic theoretical positions from which treatment 
methods have been carefully researched and deduced (e.g., 
the phenomenological positions of Kelly and Rogers, and the 
behavioural position of Wolpe). In many cases, however,,the 
' I-
claims are very subjective with minimal links to systematic 
research or theory. Recent publications indicate the 
existence of over 200 varieties of psychotherapy (Herink, 1980, 
cited in Garfield, 1982), and as many as 140 in the mainstream 
(Marshall, 1980). 
Further complicating the issue is the fact that individual 
practitioners often develop their own idiosyncratic styles 
that mix a number of these approaches ending up with a com-
promise approach which has no theoretical purity in terms of 
any of these multiple varieties. This acutely exacerbates 
the loose relationship between theory and practice that, as 
we have suggested above, already exists in many of the new 
mushrooming approaches. The nett unfortunate result for 
psychotherapy at large is one of bewilderment and confusion. 
The position is graphically expressed in the quotations that 
follow from Kovel (1976), Strupp (1978), and Heaton (1979). 
In the introduction to his book of guidelines on the principle 
appraoches to psychotherapy, Kovel (1976) makes the following 
observation: 
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The prospective customer, emotionally hurt, 
his judgement often compromised, feels at times 
like a stroller down the mid-way of a county 
fair, surrounded by hawkers shouting a confused 
jumble of overlapp~ng terminology, quarterbaked 
claims and polemics ... 
(p. 1 7) 
Strupp (1978) in an overview on psychotherapy research and 
practice greets the reader with the following set of comments: 
A newcomer's first impression of modern psycho-
therapy is bound to be bewilderment: One 
observes a welter of theories and practices 
that seemingly have little in common (Harper, 
1975); a melange of practitioners whose phil-
osophical leanings, training, and activities 
are grossly divergent; a wide range of persons 
who seek therapy for reasons that are often not 
very clear; an assortment of human unhappiness, 
malfunctions, and difficulties that are said 
to benefit from psychotherapy; a cacophony of 
claims and counterclaims that therapy is either 
highly effective or useless; a mixture of awe, 
fear, and puzzlement that greets the disclosure 
that someone is "in therapy".· 
(p. 3) 
Our final illustrat~on comes from an article by Heaton (1979) 
on philosophical pr6blems in psychotherapy theory. He states 
as follows: 
There is little doubt that psychotherapy is 
in a state of deplorable confusion. There 
ia a profusion of different therapeutic schools 
- Freudian, Kleinian, London Jungian, Zurich 
Jungian, Reichian, Gestalt, Rogerian, construct 
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therapy, behaviour therapy, primal scream 
and so on. There is confusion as to whether 
therapy is best given individually, to the 
family, in.groups, within a community or should 
be directed at society itself .... These 
therapies and ideas tend to have little contact 
with one another, and are more like a heap of 
recipes for a state of mental health which is 
left undefined than the products of a healthy 
systematic and self-critical science. 
(p.176) 
The above quotations highlights two factors in particular which 
contribute to confusion in psychotherapy. One is a multi-·-
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plicity of theori~s an~ractices.~ The other is the theoretically 
weak and unscientific nature of many of the practice claims. 
A third factor which probably contributes more than anything 
else to chaos in the science is highlighted by Chessick (1977, 
1980). This factor is the problem of theoretical approaches to 
psychopathology and its treatment which appear to be contradictory. 
The behavioural 'man as a machine', Chessick points out, is in 
opposition to the existentialist 'man as a joyous creature 
reaching out for transcendence'. Accordingly their approaches 
to psychotherapy are also in opposition. Behaviourism views the 
shaping of responses as therapeutic, whereas existentialism 
claims that the encounter is primarily therapeutic. Freud's 
classical psychoanalysis, with its focus on the uncovering of 
unconscious conflicts as primary, is in turn contradictory to 
both the behavioural and existential views. These contradictions, 
of which Chessick has only mentioned a very few, create a 
dilemma of apparent irreconcilability of approaches in psycb_C!.,:" 
_therapy which plagues the science. 
Siegler (1966) and Rychlak (1968) specifically address the prob-
lem of theoretical diversity and the confusion, contradictions 
and strife it creates in the wider p~ofessional setting of the 
psychiatric hospital team. With regard to programmes for the 
hospital treatment of schizophrenics, Siegler states as follows: 
Most programmes unknowingly involve two or 
more theories which, if seriously and consis-
tently applied, would have diverse and mutually 
incompatible consequences. In short, to inquire 
into the theoretical underpinnings of a part-
icular programme, such as that of a hospital, 
is to uncover a Tower of Babel. 
· It is not desirable that this Tower of Babel 
of non-comparable theories should exist. In a 
laboratory study, such confusion would be merely. 
unworkable; in the daily care of schizophrenic 
patients, it is lik~ly to be disastrous. 
(p.1193) 
The contradictory models Siegler refers to are those of the 
medical, moral, psychoanalytic and family models. He gives 
an example of the kind of confusion that can result from such 
models being randomly used together as follows: 
For example, a family bringing their 
schizophrenic adolescent to a doctor who 
used the psychoanalytic model might agree 
to the treatment which was offered, how-
ever strange it might sound to them, be-
cause "he is the doctor" and he knows what 
"treatment" is best. But if it should 
happen that the patient does not progress, 
the family will be properly outraged at the 
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analyst's suggestion that th~s is because 
the family does not really want the patient 
to get well, or that the family damaged their 
child so much that he cannot benefit from 
treatment. It is not consistent with the 
medical model to accuse families of causing 
or worsening their patient's illness; it is 
a working assumption of medicine that families 
wish their members to be well and will co-
operate, providing that they have sufficient 
information to do so. 
(Siegle:r, 1966, p.1202) 
Rychlak (1968, p.421) corroborates Siegler 1 s view and proposes 
that probably "in no other meeting of minds" is there greater 
confusion over how to approach clients than in the approach 
of the psychiatric team in the hospital sett~ng. He makes 
the point that normal interdisciplinary differences in approach 
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to the client are made infinitely more complicated by the serious 
within disciplinary theoretical differences that exist for 
psychology. 
It is evident from the position as outlined above, that there 
is a crisis at the interface between multiple theories and 
psychotherapy practice of serious proportions. Since the -
problem is one that relates·to the state of our knowledge in 
the science, it is an epistemological crisis. On urgent 
ethical grounds Rychlak (1968, p.422) suggests a remedying of 
the situation by psychologists seeking to understand themselves 
as part of a group "united to serve society in a patterned mode 
of endeavour". The purpose of this thesis is precisely a res-
. 
ponse to this need for a "patterned" or systematic mode of 
endeavour to guide the activ.ities of psychotherapists in the 
face of their epistemological dilemma. The first essential 
step is to clearly identify the problem. 
1.1.1 Specification of the Problem 
The major points which have emerged from the discussion so 
far can be summarized as follows: 
1. Psychotherapy is the procedure by which therapists apply 
psychological techniques to ameliorate emotional and 
behavioural problems. 
2. The emotional or behavioural problem is necessarily under-
stood from a particular theoretical orientation (denoted 
't' in figures to follow), which logically determines a 
method of treatment. 
3. There are multiple approaches to psychotherapy which often 
appear to contradict one another, both conceptually and 
in the execution of treatment methods. 
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4. The relationship between thoeretical orientation and methods 
of treatment tends to be loose within individual approaches. 
5. There tends to be a blurring of boundaries between indi-
vidual approaches by those who use compromise approaches. 
6. There is no systematic overall conceptual basis to guide 
the action of psychotherapists given this choice of 
multiple appraoches. 
From the above summary, the major problem areas can be isolated 
as follows: 
1. Multiple contradictory approaches to psychotherapy. 
2. Looseness between conceptual bases and procedure both 
within and between psychotherapy approaches. 
3. The absence of a conceptual basis to guide procedure in 
the discipline as a whole. 
Reputable workers in the philosophy of science and psychology 
(Katsoff, 1953; Kuhn, 1962, 1970; Rychlak, 1968; Rotter, 
1969) suggest that sound conceptual frameworks are essential 
for the consequential study of phenomena in science. Such 
frameworks are necessary to indicate the direction scientific 
procedures should take. Communities of scientists working 
together within a shared framework or paradigm, provide the 
necessary basis for progress in science (Kuhn, 1962, 1970). 
Advances, according to Kuhn, depend on stubborn commitment to 
resolving difficulties within a particular paradigm, and 
not lightly giving up. Considering the multiple level problem 
of conceptual looseness inpsychotherapy as outlined above 
(within and between appraoches and as a guide for the discipline 
as a whole), it is no wonder that we are faced with a position 
of bewilderment and confusion. Psychotherapy in its present 
state is far-removed from the conceptual solidarity necessary 
for a systematic and healthy science. 
Central to the three problems we have identified above, is 
the fact of diverse psychological theories. It is necessary 
therefore to examine the literature for its contribution with 
regard to this basic dilemma. 
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1.2 CENTRAL !1ETATHEORETICP.L PERSPECTIVES 
This sub-section will briefly examine some central metatheor-
etical perspectives on the existence of diverse psychological 
theories. As argued above it is from this fundamental situation 
that confusion in psychotherapy exists. Problems identified 
in the previous sub-section ~ill be examined in detail in 
this sub-section from a metatheoretical point of view. 
1.2.1 Irresolvable Contradictions and a Multi-Paradigmatic 
Science 
Common metatheoretical attempts to clarify the confusion in 
the state of psychological theories have been to isolate his-
torically two broad oppositional philosophical positions basic 
to the development of science (mechanistic vs. organismic), 
which have translated themselves into behaviourism and phenom-
enology, the two main theoretical approaches to man (Lerner, 
1976; Hitt, 1969; Wertheimer, 1972). Behaviourism pertains 
to a man who is passive and knowable, to a science that studies 
behaviour and is atomistic, objective, precise, experimental 
and data oriented. Phenomenology, on the other hand, sees 
man as active and unknowable. Its orientation is wholistic, 
subjective, experiential and theory oriented. This behavioural 
(mechanistic) vs. phenomenological (organismic) oppositional 
dimension corresponds exactly with Rychlak's demonstrative/ 
dialectical dimension (1968, 1970, 1981, 1982), which was re-
referred to in the Introduction. As stated there, when 
reasoning begins with assumptions which the theorist knows to 
be true from the outset, then this is a mechanistic, demonstrative 
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line of reasoning. When reasoning starts from the premise 
of the unknown and attempts to create new meanings which are 
relative in nature,.· this is- an organismic dialectical form of 
reasoning. 
The literature goes on to reflect that human behaviour is des-
cribed in many relevant modes which have their roots in one 
or other of these two broad intellectual traditions. Rychlak 
in particular has elaborated on this theme. He suggests that 
personality theorists with their theories of illness 1 theories 
of cure and therapeutic techniqu~s will tend to be classed on 
one or other side of this basic dimension in terms of the 
strategies of theorizing they adhere to. Behaviour theory 
and therapy for example adhere to the tenets of .the demon-
strative tradition 1 whereas Gestalt 1 Freud and Jung's psycho-
analytical theory and Kelly's Construct theory fall on the 
side of dialectical reasoning. 
Rychlak maintains that it is not possible to get rid of this 
basic demonstrative/dialectical duality with any higher order 
theoretical abstraction. Historically it has been shown to 
be a fundamental and irreducible contradiction in the nature 
of science. Psychological theories which fall on either side 
of this dimension must also therefore be unaerstood to be funda-
mentally and irreducibly contradictory. For example 1 behaviour 
theory is in opposition to each of Gestalt, personal construct and 
psychoanalytical theory in terms of their fundamental strategies of 
reasoning. ?he point that is being illustrated here is that 
already in terms of this single dialectical/demonstrative 
--· - --- ·~--
dimension there are multiple contradictions between approaches --- ~-----
I 
to psychotherapy which at a fundamental root metaphor level 
have shown themselves to be irreducible. 
If one goes on·to consider other dimensions for comparison 
between psychological theories it is possible to find contra-
dictions ad infinitum between the various approaches. 
Rychlak (1982), for example, draws a distinction within the 
dialectical framework between the Gestalt approach as a sen-
sory phenomenology and the Kellian and Jungian approaches as 
logical phenomenologies. And as mentioned earlier, there are 
fundamental contradictions between the existential and psycho-
analytical approaches highlighted by Chessick (1977, 1980), 
and between the family, medical, moral and psychoanalytic 
models used in the psychiatric hOspital setting as noted by 
Siegler (1966). 
It is not possible out of convenience, to dispense with any of 
these multiple contradictory theories as long as they have shown 
themselves to have psychotherapeutic utility. This is clearly 
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reflected in the literature (Jung, 1926 in Jacobi, 1974; Jung, 
1935; Rychlak, 1968; Kovel, 1976; NaJan, '1979) ~ The following 
quotations have been selected to illustrate this point: 
'The most exhaustive technique can only glean 
a small fraction of the communicable mental con-
tents of another human being, and while each bit 
and unit of understanding adds to the image we 
form of him, the image remains but a reflection of 
another consciousness no one else can ever share 
- any more than sparks can be collected as they 
fly off a wheel. And even this received picture 
may be grossly devoid of basic detail. 
(Kovel, 1976, p.26). 
The protean life of the psyche is a greater, 
if more inconvenient truth than the rigid 
certainty of the one-eyed point of view. 
It certainly does not make the problems of 
psychology any easier. But it does free us 
from the incubus of 'nothing but', which is 
the incessant leitmotiv of all one-sidedness. 
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(Jung, 1926, para.156, quoted in Jacobi, 1974) 
... any theory of the human psyche, and any 
form of psychotherapy, must be incomplete un-
less it incorporates the psychodynamic point 
of view. This applies particularly, of course, 
to learning theory and behaviour therapy. 
But the converse is also true: dynamic psycho-
therapy itself is incomplete unless it incorpor-
ates the theory and techniques of other forms of 
therapy of which of course behaviour therapy 
is the most important. 
(Malan, 1979, p.254) 
In summary, these quotations suggest that the complexity of the 
psyche is so great as to render a single viewpoint just a pale 
reflection of the total reality. And that different viewpoints 
cannot be dismissed because of the convenience of a single 
point of view. It is interesting to note that Malan's choice 
offundamental viewpoints, which must be included to complete 
a psychotherapeutic endeavour (psychodynamic psychotherapy and 
beavhiour therapy), belong on opposite sides of Rychlak 1 s 
dialectical/demonstrative bifurcation. The fact that it is 
not possible to reduce psychological theories beyond this fun-
damental duality is reflected, it seems, in Malan's need to 
specify for completeness in psychotherapy, a minimal 
representative of at least one psychotherapy approach from 
each side of this behavioural/phenomenological oppositional 
dimension. 
An article by Dooley (1982), in which he reviews two cele-
brated exchanges between pheonomenology and behaviourism (the 
1956 Rogers-Skinner Symposium, and nearly twenty years later, 
the dialogue between Day and Giorgi), strongly supports the 
irreconcilability of these two broad approaches to theorizing 
in psychology. In spite of goodwill and the desire for recon-
ciliation, it is apparent from Dooley's review that the adher-
ents of the opposing sides fail to make logical contact. Even 
when what appears to be common ground is carefully explored, 
a deeper conflict emerges which relates to the fundamental dif-
ferences outlined above of objective (external) versus subjec-
tive (internal) accounts of man. 
Dooley illuminates the conflicts of these two debates in such 
a way as to suggest that they have the character of a Kuhnian 
paradigm1 debate and makes a convincing case for psychology as 
a science with at least these two paradigms. This view is 
corroborated by authors such as Vann Spuirell (1983) and Lambley 
(1971). Vann Spuirell suggests that psychoanalysis fits the 
criterion of a Kuhnian paradigm since it is a discipline with 
a clearly articulated set of rules used by a community for the 
solving of puzzles as evidenced in the pyschoanalytic problem 
case conference. Lambley (1971, pp.13-14) states that "the 
term paradigm has been used in psychology ... and its meaning to 
1 A paradigm as defined by Kuhn (1962, 1970) is the set of 




psychologists can be said to be fairly well-established." 
He feels justified therefore in using the term as Dooley does 
for the two broad subjective (existential-phenomenological) 
versus objective (behavioural) value orientations in psychology. 
This emergent multiparadigmatic view of psychology is in 
contrast to the views of authors such as Shetter (1975), 
Kuhn (1982) and Koch (1969) who contend that the discipline is 
pre-paradigmatic since it has not acquired the cohesiveness of 
a universally received paradigm. This view, however, is not 
upheld in terms of the arguments presented. above. First of 
all, the goal of a single universal theory does not seem 
feasible in terms of the historical indications presented 
here of fundamentally contradictory theories. And secondly, 
it seems reasonable to suggest that certain broad approaches 
have acquired sufficient coherence to warrant the term para-
digm, and hence the te~m multi-paradigmatic as applied to the 
whole science. 
The important implication that arises out of this is that psy-
chology must commit itself to advancement as a multitheoretical 
science rather than one that strives for an all-encompassing 
theory. Even Royce (1970), whose firmly held ideal is towards 
unification in psychology by means of a general theory, reluc-
t 
tantly admits that in terms of any discipline of study to 
date, including the physical sciences, this goal is probably 
unattainable. He maintains that a focus on area theories 
rather than on general theories of behaviour has shown itself 
empirically to be a more useful venture. His reluctant s~g~ 
gestion for psychology therefore, is more self-conscious concern 
for developing theories to account for relatively limited as-
pects of behaviour which can contribute to understanding in a 
multiplicative way. Once again we see, as with the Rogers-
Skinner, Day-Giorgi behavioural vs. phenomenological debates, 
that even where the genuinely sought after goal is reconcil-
iation or unification in terms of a general theory, this 
seems to be an unattainable goal. 
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Whilst on the subject of Royce, it is important to note briefly 
that in similar mode to Rychlak, he has analysed the state of 
theoretical psychology by isolating different strategies of 
theorizing or knowing. He suggests there are three classes 
of theorizing (the rational, the metaphoric and the empirical), 
and tabulates psychological systems in terms of these epistem-
ological characteristics. By means of this classificatory 
analysis he provides, as Rychlak has done, clearer definition 
on the nature of approaches in psychology, and creates a 
dimension for isolating commonalities and divergencies between 
the various approaches. 
In sum, what has emerged from this metatheoretical analysis 
so far is as follows. A multiple theory position is currently 
being accepted as the necessary status quo of the science be-
cause of the complexity of the-phenomenon under study, and be-
cause of the irreconcilability of theoretical positions~. We 
see that some of the more established positions in psych6logy 
have acquired the status of a Kuhnian paradigm. The indi--
cations are that psychology must move in the direction of a multi-
paradigmatic science ratherthan towards unification via a gen-
-eral theory. That psychotherapy is committed to the use of 
multiple theories is clearly reflected in the literature. 
1.2.2 Current Metatheoretical Indications for the 
Practice of Psychotherapy. 
The important question that arises now, is of how properly 
to utilize these multiple theories in practice. The action 
the psychotherapist takes in this situation bears a crucial 
relationship to the issue of competence and the ability to 
offer an ethical service (Rychlak, 1968; Lambley, 1971). 
In spite of the importance of this question, however, the 
following quote by Rychlak is typical of the limited extent to 
which it has been answered in the metatheoretical literature. 
We must avoid thinking in terms of only 
one side, and cross over whenever and 
wherever it is possible to do so. 
journeys to the other side will serve to 
educate us and raise our level of meaning-
ful understanding. 
(p.457). 
Similar global type answers have been provided by Wertheimer 
(1972) and Ornstein (1975). It is evident that this kind of 
answer, which is basically to avoid one-sidedness in the 
science, lacks sufficient specificity when one's concern is 
the approach to the psychologically disturbed patient. Con- , 
sidering the contradictory natur~ of the various approaches 
should one-sidedness be avoided ih a single patient? Should 
one cross over from one approach to another in the same patient 
whenever and wherever possible? And if one should cross over, 
in what manner should this be done? 
What is necessary in order to provide more than arbitrary 
32 
33 
answers to these questions is an all-encompassing metatheoretical ------ --
scheme to stand outside the framework of all the psychological 
theories and provide an interpretation of these theoretical 
formulations themselves. Such a scheme would constitute a -· ~ -
theory about the nature of_:theories (i.e., an epistemology) 
and serve as the reference point from whichprinciples for 
pragmatic action could be logically deduced (see Figure 1,p.34). 
Rychlak and Royce's attempts. at the metatheoretical level to. 
add clarification on the state of psychological science do not 
have the theoretical status of the required scheme. They are 
at the\ descriptive leve~and do not have explanatory power, 
therefore, from which answers for practice can be logically 
deduced. As noted earlier, these authors have isolated theo-
rizing traditions in terms of which it is possible to type all 
psychological theories. What they have not done, however, is 
to provide any explanatory comment on the nature and very exis-
tence of these theoretical traditions themselyes. They have ---- -
merely observed that they are fundamental in the history of 
science. 
A theorist of note, however, who has stepped outside all theo-
retical traditions in psychology and attempted a metatheoretical ---
explanation of the situation is Lambley (1971). His thesis 
proposes a Sartrian existential theory of psychological science 
with which he hopes to give the psychotherapist some under-
standing of his role as a theorizer (or valuer) and thereby 
provide pointers for pragmatic action. He argues that since 















EPISTEMOLOGICAL FLOWCHART FOR PRACTICE 
EPISTEMOLOGY SERVES AS AN EXPLANATORY SYSTEM 
FOR DIVERSE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES (t1 ••• tn). 
IT IMPLIES EPISTEMOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES WHICH 




orientation a psychotherapist adopts, no orientation can ever 
be totally pure. Every approach chosen, therefore.,-is_i]1; - ' --. 
evitably eclectic (the therapist's own mixture) to some extent. 
Lambley uses this extreme existential principle as the ration-
ale for a full-blown conceptually loose eclectic approach in 
practice. Because there are no ultimate theoretical limits, , 
he argues, the psychotherapist is always free to move between' 
theories and beyond the theoretical limits put upon him. 
Earlier in this section, conceptual looseness both within and 
\ 
between theories was identified as a major source of current 
confusion in psychotherapy. It is evident that Lambley\s 
theoretical formulation and deductions for practice do not 
provide a suitable solution to this _situation. Rather they 
will serve to contribute to the problem of a conceptually 
loose and therefore inconsequential science. In addition, 
Lambley's formulation makes no attempt to address another / 
source of confusion identified in the science, the problem of 
contradictory theories. 
It is the contention of this thesis that the philosophy of 
complementarity, ~iels Bohr's epistemological resolution to 
fundamental contradictions encountered in the physical sciences, 
can offer a more favourable metatheoretical framework for 
psychotherapy. In contrast to the classificatory analyses of 
Rychlak and Royce, it has the necessary status of theory and 
therefore it can be used to make logical deductions with regard 
to psychotherapy practice. In contrast to Lambley's eclectic 
formula, its principles will promote conceptual tightness in 
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practice and therefore be more in keeping with a consequential 
science. And finally, it has direct relevance to the problem 
of contradictory theories. 
1 • 3 S UM!.ffiR Y 
This section set out to examine the nature of the episterna-------·-·---
logical confusion that exists for the psychotherapist at the 
interface between theory and practice. Three major problem 
areas were identified as follows: ((1 }multiple contradictory 
" 
approaches, (2) conceptual looseness within and between 
approaches, and (3) the absence of a conceptual basis to guide 
procedure in the discipline as a whole. 
A metatheoretical analysis of the situation suggested that 
multiple approaches must be accepted as the status quo for the 
discipline. This is because of irresolvable contradiction's 
between theories and the need for many descriptions of such 
a complex phenomenon as the psyche. In the face of this 
situation no existing metatheoretical analysis was considered 
suitable as an overall conceptual guide for practice in the 
discipline. The more promising alternative of complementarity 
will be explored in the following section. 
SECTION 2 




THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMPLEMENTARITY 
The aim of this section is to introduce Niels Bohr's philosophy 
of complementarity as an explanatory framework for the problem 
of diverse approaches in psychotherapy. From its epistemo-
logical principles guidelines for practice can be developed. 
The section is divided into three parts. Firstly, the parallel-
ism between physics and psychology will be discussed. It will 
be shown how the relevance of complementarity for psychology 
has been anticipated in the literature. Secondly, complemen-
tarity will be placed in historical context and the terms of 
its philosophy will be elucidated. Finally, the psychological 
theories of Jung and Kelly will be used to elaborate on the 
complementarity theme. In the process, the epistemological 
implications of complementarity with regard to psychotherapy 
practice will be discussed. 
2.1 MODERN PHYSICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 
In searching for a suitable metatheoretical framework for 
psychology, the most obvious reason for turning to modern 
physics is the similarity of the fundamental epistemological 
problem which confronts these two sciences. Writing specifi~ 
cally about psychotherapy Jung draws the comparison as follows:· 
We are faced in psychotherapy with a situation 
comparable with that in modern physics where 
for instance there are two contradictory theories 
of light. And just as physics does not find this 
contradiction unbridgeable, so the existence of 
many possible standpoints in psychology should 
not give grounds for assuming that the contra-
dictions are irreconcilable and the various views 
merely subjective and therefore incommensurable. 
Contradictions in a department of science merely 
indicate that its subject displays characteristics 
which at present can be grasped only by means of 
antimonies - witness the wave theory and the cor-
puscular theory of light. Now the psyche is in-
finitely more complicated than light; hence a 
great number of antimonies is required to describe 
the nature of psyche satisfactorily. 
( 1 9 3 5 , par a . 1 ) 
It is evident from the above quote that Jung draws a direct 
comparison between the problem of multiple contradictory 
theories in psychology and the same problem encountered in 
physics. He clearly makes the assumption that the.physical 
science resolution to the problem is fitting to psychology. 
The reason why physics does not find these theoretical contra-
dictions "unbridgeable" lies in the resolution offered by 
physicist Niels Bohr's philosophy of complementarity. One 
can only assume from the above statements, therefore, that 
complementarity is being accepted by Jung as his philosophical 
s~~ndpoint with specific reference to psychotherapy. Carro-
boration for this assumption comes from the many explicit ref-
erences Jung makes to Niels Bohr's philosophical position and 
its relevance for psychology in general (Jung, 1935 para.1, 
1946 para.163-4, 1948a para.1133, 1952 para.924, 1954 para. 
438-440; Adler, 1975, pp.54, · 308, 572-3). 
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Further corroboration comes from Von Franz (1972, 1976) who 
has elaborated extensively on parallels between physics and 
.psychology as·noted by Jung. 
Many of the above references are concerned with the parallism 
between basic concepts in physics and their pyschological origins 
such as space, time, matter, fields and particles, and the 
complementarity pair of opposites in the relationship between 
the conscious and unconscious minds, which are related, but not 
directly relevant issues to the particular problem being ad-
dressed in this thesis. Some of the references, however, have 
direct relevance to the thesis (Von Franz, 1972, pp.307-8; 
Jung, 1935, 1954; Adler, 1975, pp_.T08, 572) ,and leave us in 
no doubt as to Jung's epistemological position. For example, 
Jung states as follows: 
The comparison of modern psychology to modern 
physics is no idle talk. Both disciplines have, 
for all their diametrical opposition, one most 
important point in common, namely the fact that 
they both approach the hitherto "transcendental" 
region of the Invisible and Intangible, the 
world of merely analagous thought .... I don't 
claim any knowledge of modern physics myself, but 
I have worked together with the well-known physic-
ist W. Pauli for a considerable time and, as a 
result, we were both satisfied with the fact that 
there is at least a very marked rapprochement be-
tween the two most heteregenous sciences in their 
epistemological preoccupations, i.e., in their 
antimonies (f.1 light =wave and corpuscle), 
Heisenberg's "Unbestimmtheitsrelation", Bohr's 
complementarity, not to speak of the archetypal 
models of representation. 
(Adler, 1975, p.308) 
The philosophical outlook Jung adopts in accordance with 
Niels Bohr is a non-demonstrativ~, dialectical1, relativistic 
one. Jung elaborates on his position quite clearly as follows: 
The uproar over Freud's interpretations is 
entirely due to our own barbarous and childish 
naivete, which does not yet understand that· 
high rests on low, and that 'les estremes se 
touchent• really is one of the ultimate verities. 
Our mistake lies in supposing that radiant things 
are done away with by being explained from the 
shadow side. This is a regrettable error into 
which Freud himself has fallen. Shadow pertains 
to light as evil to good, and vice versa. There-
fore I cannot lament the shock which this exposure 
administered to our occidental illusions and 
pettiness; on the contrary I welcome it as an 
historic and necessary rectification of almost 
incalculable importance. For it forces us to accept 
a philosophical relativism such as Einstein ern-
bodies for mathematical physics 
Nothing, it is true, is less effective than an 
intellectual idea. But when an idea is a psychic 
fact 2 that crops up in two such totally different 
fields as psychology and physics, apparently 
without historical connection, then we must give 
it our closest attention. 
(1929, para.146-147) 
It is typical of Jung to make frequent allusions~ as he has 
done here, to ideas in need of close attention, without 
1 Dialectical and demonstrative have been defined earlier on 
p.3. 
2 The 'psychic fact' referred to here is that of philosophical 
relativism. 
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formulating or evolving them himself into a systematic doc-
trine. As mentioned earlier, Von Franz (1972, 1976) has ex-
panded in depth on some of Jung's hints with regard to parallels 
between physics and psychology, but not in the areas that 
have specific relevance to this thesis. 
Apart from Jung, additional implications concerning the rele-
vance of.complementarity as a resolution for the multiple) ' -- -
' 
theories dilemma in psychology come from physicist Niels Bohr 
himself, the originator of this conceptual development. He 
) 
spent thirty-five years (1927-1962) providing indications of 
how to broaden the application of his complementarity formu-
lation from microphysics to the life sciences, in particular 
biology, social anthropology and psychology (Jammer, 1966). 
The parallels between physics and psychology were focussed on 
mainly during the latter part of the thirty year period during 
which time Bohr produced a book entitled "Atomic Physics and 
Human Knowledge" (1958) which has many allusions to this theme. 
Jung was clearly keeping abreast of Bohr's philosophical ideas 
via his association with Wolfgang Pauli. The earlier quote 
from Jung (on p. 40 ) which makes specific reference to Bohr 
and his ideas, comes from a letter written during this latter 
period. 
In drawing attention to the relevance of complementarity to 
psychology, much of Bohr's focus, in similar vein to Jung and 
Von Franz, is on aspects which do not have direct relevance 
to this work (e.g., conscious versus unconscious complementarity; 
problems with introspection; the issue of free will and deter-
minism). However, there are definite suggestions in his 
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writings of the more grand epistemological message for psycho-
logical science with which we are directly concerned (1958, 
pp.20, 93). It was typical of Bohr, however, as with Jung, 
not to write an extensively worked out treatise on his ideas. 
There is no carefully summarised set of logical axioms 
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on complementarity which are completely defined. Working more 
in the Socratic mode, he developed a method of thinking which 
tells one how to attack and interpret problems providing rather 
a basis for further elaboration than a strict and narrow system, 
or some kind of foolproof program (Jammer, 1966; Petersen, 
1 9 6 8 ; Mehr a, 1 9 7 4) . 
Now whereas Bohr's method of thinking with regard to the problem 
of diverse theoretical possibilities has been extensively 
acknowledged and elaborated on in the physical sciences, this 
has not been the case in psychological science. Jung, more 
than anyone else, has taken the issue up, but as noted before, 
very much at the level of allusions rather than an elaborated 
set of specific implications. 
Odd references in passing to the epistemological zeitgeist of 
complementarity (Rychlak, 1981), and odd minor articles using 
the philsoophy of complementarity which have appeared in the 
psychological literature (e.g., Blackburn, 1976; Oppenheim and 
Brody, 1969), are disappointing because they do n?t address 
themselves· to the more grand possibilities of complementarity 
as a unifying epistemology for psychology. The only exception 
that has appeared in the literature to date is the work of 
Chessick (1977, 1980). He explicitly makes the same fundamental 
claim that this thesis wishes to make as follows: 
only (Niels Bohr's) 1 principle of complemen-
tarity permits a constructive (metatheoreticalJ
2 
approach to the variations in the interpretation 
of data and technique of psychotherapy 
(1977, p.263) 
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Chessick, however, has only produced two brief journal articles 
on this topic in which he has not elaborated in depth on the 
principles of complementarity. Nor has he used this philoso-
phical viewpoint to arrive at any more specific epistemological 
indications for psychotherapy practice than Rychlak, V'lertheimer 
and Ornstein have provided (cf. our previous discussion, p. 32). 
which is simply to recognize the relative rightness: of theories 
and to avoid one-sidedness. 
Considering the important allusions that have been made by 
these two academic masters in their respective fields (Bohr 
and Jung), with regard to the relevance of complementarity to 
psychology, it seems incongruous that there has been so little 
development of this theme. Progress in this direction is hampered 
it seems by those who equate physics purely with the mechanistic, 
positivistic, demonstrative mode of reasoning and therefore 
resist its conscious use as a model in any respect._ This is 
equivalent to throwing the baby out with the bathwater in terms 
of the broad epistemological lesson to be gained from quantum 
theory. Discoveries in atomic physics during this century have 
forced physicists to understand t~~~cBp~ual framework of phy--=---- -
--sics itself from a non-demonstrative, dialectical perspective 
& ----- --· 
1' 2 Author's inserts in parenthesis. 
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and find it to be deeply anchored in the groundwork of human 
cognition. In this view, human cognition is, acknowledged-as 
the more basic concept and, ironically, our view of nature 
turns on its head. ,Psychology, and no longer physics, be-
comes the more basic science. There should be no resistance 
or tardiness, therefore, in developing for psychology a philo-
sophical principle that is fundamentally psychological. 
Another source of possible resistance to the use of the wave/ 
particle philosophical developments for psychological science, 
is on the grounds that the subject matter of the two disciplines 
are not comparable. As Von Franz (1976, p.S) states, however, 
"a parallelism of thought models between the two disciplines 
does not imply that their subject matters are directly related." 1 
Those who wish to compare human behaviour to light and, finding 
them incompatible, wish to say that the way in which knowledge 
is acquired in relation to each of them cannot receive clari-
fication from the same philosophy, are arguing fallaciously. 
Stich thinking is not only fallacious but an unfortunate reduction 
of the potential utility of the philosophy. The wave/particle 
dilemma in physics should be viewed as highlighting, by means 
of its graphic nature, epistemological notions of great sig-
nificance to be taken into account in understanding the nature 
of any scientific endeavour. 
The purpose of the following sub-sections, therefore, is to 
take up a long neglected challenge and go behond the threshold 
of existing attempts to relate complementarity to psychology. 
1 Author's emphasis 
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2.2 PHYSICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMPLEMENTARITY. 
2 . 2 . 1 The History of . Quantum Theory 
During the year 1900 Max Planck, a young physicist, demonstrated 
that a lump of matter could be represented by unnumerable par-
ticles. For four years this idea lived precariously and al-
most forsaken until in 1905, Einstein showed that radiation also 
consisted of bundles (given the name of 'quanta'), adding credi-
bility to the young Planck's idea. These findings were revo-
lutionary and threw physics into epistemological chaos because 
they appeared to contradict the existing generally accepted 
wave theory of light. In short, it was found that light under-
goes diffraction which can only be explained by adopting the 
nineteenth century electromagnetic wave theory of light, whilst 
in single electron experiments, the observations could only be 
realised by postulating particles (quanta) of light whose mom-
entum and position were subject to probability restrictions. 1 
Neither of these two theories could be discredited because they 
each gave equally correct results. 
The universally accepted epistemological paradigm at the time 
was the demonstrative one of classical Newtonian empiricism. 
Fundamental to this position, as we know, is that scientific laws 
state truths and a necessary logical conclusion of their position 
is the tenet of non-contradiction between theories (Losee, 1972). 
Because theories are taken to be reality, diverse theoretical 
1 This was later formulated at Heisenberg's Uncertainty Prin~iple. 
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explanations of the same phenomenon could not be tolerated, 
and physics was thrown into civil war with first the wave and 
then the particle theory taking advantage. 
During the year 1920, whilst the battle between wave and 
particle was still locked in stalemate, a physicist Niels Bohr 
became head of a newly created institute for theoretical physics 
in Copenhagen. A steady stream of people flowed into Copen1 
gagen to work on the quantum dilemma with Bohr, work which in-
eluded intertse discussions as well as lengthy calculations. 
More than any of his contemporaries. Bohr stressed the tentative 
and symbolic nature of the atomic models that were used, 
and out of these discussions he evolved a revolutionary alterna-
tive view of the meaning of physical explanation to that of 
classical empiricism. He carne to the conclusion that both 
theories must be taken as correct since each gave correct re-
sults, and urged for the adoption of a non-demonstrative, dia-
lectical viewpoint in which there was room for both theories. 
Bohr expressed the new viewpoint in his general principle of 
complementarity which provided, in essence, the following reso-
lution: Neither view of the phenomenon when taken by itself 
was considered to be a complete or totally correct description 
of nature since the observations were seen to arise 
not from the 'light' itself (if such an 
idea even has any·rneaning), but from the 
observation of light as it ipteracts with 
the experimental equipment and in the des-
cripti~n of such observations in language 
that only contains the classical terms 'wave' 
and 'particle' as models for the phenomenon. 
(Blackburn, 1971, p.348) 
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The above interpretation had a dramatic impact in physics and 
the philosophy of science. It became, and still is, the 
g~nerally accepted doctrine to account for the quantum dilemma 
(Jammer, 1966; Bergstein, 1972; VonWeizsacker, 1973; Russell, 
1979; Davies, 1980; Powers, 1982). It represented a revo-
lution in the nature of thinking about scientific knowledge 
from the classical Newtonian assumption of the world that can 
be analysed into distinct parts, each having a totally deter-
mined nature, to the assumption that the world is an indivis-
able whole in which parts appear as abstractions or approx~ 
imations (see Figure 2, p. 49). In the new view, there is~ a 
strong emphasis on the role of the observer and the consequent 
imdeterminate and relative nature of the observations. Unique 
descriptions have ceased to exist and several contradictory 
descriptions are incorporated to give a more complete picture 
of the phenomenon. The classical viewpoint of "wide is the 
brain and narrow is the world" is turned on its head and re-
placed by a totally opposite viewpoint - "wide is the world 
and narrow is the brain" (quotations from Schiller, in Jammer, 
1966,p.73). 
A minority of physicists (amongst them Einstein) have persis-
' 
tently refused to relinquish the classical view of knowledge, 
and have held out against the complementarity interpretation 
of quantum physics. Challenging objections such as these 
' 
played an important part for Bohr in the sharpening and evo-
lution of his ideas. He produced, for example, a celebrated 
very skilful response to Einstein in which he invoked the 
latter's own theory of relativity against him in support 
;I 
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NEWTONIAN (CLASSICAL) POSITION : Mechanistic, deterministic, 
demonstrative. Observations (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , tn) ~reality. 
Different systems of observation yield the identical picture 
of reality. Reality is totally known (determined) and contra-
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QUANTUM (COMPLEMENTARITY) POSITION : Organismic, probabalistic, 
dialectical. Observations (t1 r.t2 , t 3 , tn) are approximations 
to reality but are not it. Reality is fundamentally unknown 
(indeterminate) and contradictory observations are logical. 
FIGURE 2 : THE CLASSICAL/QUANTUM REVOLUTION 
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of complementarity. Up to the present time, no-one has 
succeeded in making any inroads into the general acceptance 
of the new epistemological view. Recently, a crucial ex-
periment was conducted in Paris (Aspect et al, 1982) in an 
all-out attempt to discredit complementarity. The negative 
l 
result of this experiment, however, has served only to Rrovide 
, 
further confirmation of its position. The indications at 
present are very strong that the complementarity viewpoint on 
the nature of knowledge is here to stay. 
2.2.2 The Origins and Epistemological Implications 
of Complementarity 
The specific concepts underlying the classical/quantum revo-
'lution has a long history and can be detected in embryonic 
form in the controversies of the Ancient Greeks. The shift 
from Democritus' extreme atomism to the relativism of 
Anaxagoras and Aristotle, is reflective in many ways of the 
gestalt psychologists' anti-elementistic move in the early 
nineteenth century, and of the change from nineteenth century 
Newtonian atomism to the present complementarity thesis. 
Broadly, all. these revolutionary shifts reflect moves from 
demonstrative to dialectical modes of reasoning. 
The philosophical underpinnings of the gestalt revolution are 
so similar to those of the quantum revolution, that two great 
physicists working within the field of microphysics, Hax Planck 
and Max Boring, expected the gestalt approach in psychology 
to "clarify a difficult issue which had just arisen in quantum 
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physics, if not the concept of quantum itself'' (Kohler, p. 729 
1959). The parallel between complementarity and gestalt can 
be understood within the context of their link with the German 
philosopher, Kant whose influence on both the gestal tists 
(Boring, 1951) and Niels Bohr (Heelan, 1965; Elsasser-, 1971; Von 
Weizsacker, 1973)1 is profound. They each have the problem of 
apparent contradictory evidence to resolve. The gestaltists 
wish to explain the problem of apparent movement where there 
is no actual movement, and Bohr, aswe know, wishes to explain 
the problem of contradictory theories. The principle they both 
adopt from the philosophy of Kant to resolve their dilemma·s 
is as follows: objects are perceived in a limited way, because 
organization (a screening device) is necessarily applied on the 
sense data we accept. Phaedras' motorcycle as described by 
Pirsig (1974) provides a good example of the dilemma which the 
Kantean philosophy seeks to resolve. 
If I hold my head to the left and look down at 
the handle grips and front wheel and map carrier 
and gas tank I get one pattern of sense data. 
If I move my head to the right I get another 
slightly different pattern of sense data. The 
two views are different. The angles of the 
planes and curves of the metal are different. 
The sunlight strikes them differently. If there 
is no logical basis for substance then there's 
no logical basis for concluding that what's pro-
duced these two views is the same motorcycle. 
Now we've a real intellectual impasse. Our 
reason, which is supposed to make things more 
intelligible, seems to be making them less intell-
igible, and when reason thus defeats its own pur-
pose something has to be changed in the structure 
of our reason itself. 
(p126.127) 
These views of the motorcycle according to Pirsig, of which 
there can be any amount, build up in our minds an a priori 
motorcycle which has·continuity in time and space and whose 
existence depends on the sense data, but the sense data are 
not it. The analogy extended in terms of complementarity is 
as follows. 
Each view of the motorcycle is apparently contradictory in the 
sense of being different to any other view. As an entity each 
view is exclusive of any other view since it is entirely de-
pendent on the particular viewpoint adopted in relation to the 
object being viewed. A single observational arrangement can-
not adopt two viewpoints simultaneously. It can only ever 
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adopt one position at a time and get an aspect of the whole, 
then another position etc. One viewpoint necessarily recipro-
cally inhibits any alternative viewpoint. And since viewpoints 
exist as separate entities, they will appear to contradict each 
other. Sometimes they may appear to be very contradictory, 
e.g., the handle bars and rear mudguard of the motorcycle. 
The more views there are of the motorcycle the more these 
cumulative views will approximate the "real" motorcycle, and 
the more complete will be the description. Each view is de-
pendent on the complementary subject/object relation between 
the observational arrangement and the motorcycle. And finally, 
a priori leaps of reason are necessary to cope with these con-
flicting descriptions, or the world will cease to make any sense. 
If we translate these ideas into what we do when we theorize 
about an object, it is as though we ascribe a set of rules 
' 
. I 
(i.e., a formal scheme) onto the object as one would ascribe a 
set of rules for a game onto a pack of cards. Rules are 
arbitrary, but are determined to some extent by the particular 
nature of the object. More than one rule is possible for more 
than one game with the same set of cards. Now the important 
point here is that it is necessary to adhere to one particular 
aspect or viewpoint (theory) on card playing at a time and 
exclusively use the particular set of articulated rules per-
taining to that choice, in order for the game to make any 
sense. If you try to play two games at once, contradictions 
are likely to arise; it will be impossible to plan strategies 
or analyse the progressofthe game or to communicate with 
other players about what you are doing. In other words, at 
one time, it is necessary to use one set of rules pertaining 
to one theoretical arrangement, exclusively. One set of rules 
reciprocally inhibits the other. 
By exploring this analogy further, we can extract additional 
implications. If a person who was uninitiated into the rules 
of card games watched, for argument's sake, three different 
card games, he might see a lot of surface commonalities. For 
example, he would easily note that there are four people who 
sit around a table, shuffle and deal identical sets of cards, 
hold fans of cards in their hands to conceal the contents from 
other, etc. Only the person who was initiated into the rules 
of card game~ would detect the deeper structures that differen-
tiate one game from the other. Each game only exists in its 
own right by virtue of the fact that it negates certain as-
pects of the rules of alternative games. If there is no 
umambiguous set of rules then there will be no possibility for 
53 
54 
organized card playing action or systematic evaluation of action. 
The detailed illustrative material has been used here in an 
effort to eliminate confusion that can occur concerning the 
meaning of complementarity because of the wave/particle duality 
which served as the original illustration of the philosophy, 
and the fact that secondary texts frequently fail to preface 
"contradictory descriptions" vTith "apparently contradictory". 
From the motor cycle and card playing examples however, we can 
clearly see that the whole point of complementarity is that 
descriptions (of which th~re can be not only two but an 
infinite number) are not reflecting fundamental contradictions 
within the total object. They are reflecting contradictory 
viewpoints or approaches ~o the identical object, the whole of 
which can never be encompassed in one single approach due to 
the limited nature of our minds, theory, language or piece of 
transmitting apparatus. Complementarity should not be confused * 
either with the Hegelian philosophy of thesis, antithesis and 
synthesis which it is not. The whole point of complementary 
descriptions is that they are reciprocally inhibiting and 
mutually exclusive and therefore can never achieve a sy~thesis. 
If the wave and particle descriptions could be synthesized 
there would be no contradictory theories, and the entire basis 
for the complementarity philosophy and this thesis would not exist. 
Our 'narrow' or limited minds result in many apparently contra-
ictory concepts in the attempt to understand our 'wide' world 
as we have seen not only in physics, but in the many contra-
dietary psychological viewpoints mentioned in Section 1 of this 
work. To view these not as contradictory but as part of the 
same reality (which is what complementarity does for us) 
involves a c.onceptual· leap as revolutionary and as subtle as 
changing from a Ptolemaic world view (sun revolves around 
earth) to a Copernican world view (earth revolves around sun) 
when your immediate sense experience is telling you otherwise. 
However, once the Kantian leap in reason is made in the form 
of complementarity the world of contradictory viewpoints once 
again makes sense. The urge to dispense with viewpoints or 
to synthesise them into a single viewpoint completely loses 
its impetus within this new conceptual context which reduces 
the problem of contradictions to a pseudo-dilemma. 
Niels Bohr (1934) states his philosophical position quite 
clearly as follows: 
In considering the well-known paradoxes which 
are encountered in the application of the quantum 
theory to atomic structure 1 it is essential to 
remember 1 in this connection 1 that the properties 
of atoms are always obtained by observing their 
reactions under collisions or under the influence 
of radiation, and that the above-mentioned 
limitation on the possibilities of measurement is 
directly related to the apparent contradictions 
' 
which have been revealed in the discussion of the 
nature of light and of material particles. In 
order to emphasize that we are not concerned here 
with real contradictions, the author suggested in 
an earlier article the term "complementarity". 
In consideration of the above-mentioned reciprocal 
symmetry which occurs already in classical 
mechanics, perhaps the term "reciprocity" is more 
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suitable for expressing the state of affairs with 
which we are dealing. 
(p. 9 5) 
The epistemological problem under discussion may 
be characterized briefly as follows: For 
describing our mental activity, we require, on one 
hand, an objectively given content to be placed in 
opposition to a perceiving subject, while, on the 
other hand, as is already implied in such an 
assertion, no sharp separation between object and 
subject can be maintained, since the perceiving 
subject also belongs to our mental content. 
From these circumstances follows not only the 
relative meaning of eve~y concept, or rather of 
every word, the meaning depending upon our 
arbitrary choice of viewpoint, but also that we 
must, in general, be prepared to accept the fact 
. . . . . . 
that a complete elucidation of one and the same 
. . . . . . . . 1 
object may require diverse points of view which 
defy a unique description. Indeed, strictly 
speaking, the conscious analysis of any concept 
stands in a relation of exclusion to its immediate 
application. 
(p. 96) 
Additional support is gained from Bergstein (1972): 
The particle state and the wave state are·not the 
only two modes of existence of an atomic object. 
In fact an atomic object can be in any intermediate 
. . . . . 
state between the typiCal particle state and the . . . . . . . . . . 2 
typical wave state. The particular state of the 
object is closely dependent on the observational 
arrangement applied when observing the state. It 
is particularly the overlooking of this crucial 
1 , 2 Author's emphases with the purpose of stressing apparent 
contradictions, and the fact that Bohr does not restrict 




point which has led to many misunderstandings 
as to the epistemological significance of 
quantum physics. 
(p. 16) 
It should be noted from the above quotations that Bohr uses 
the word "reciprocity" as a synonym for "complementarity". 
He suggests that this term "r~ciprocity" is possibly more 
explanatory than "complementarity" of the state of affairs 
he is trying to describe. The point to which it draws our 
attention in particular is the inverse relationship between 
complementary viewpoints. The choice of one viewpoint reci-
procally inhibits the choice of alternative viewpoints. 
It is possible to distinguish in the literature two types of 
reciprocal or complementary relationships (Von Weizsacker, .. 
in Jammer, 1966, p.355). These are 'circular complementarity' 
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and 'parallel complementarity'. Circular complementarity refers 
specifically to the reciprocal or mutually inhibiting relation-
ship between the observer and the object observed. This is 
the aspect of Quantum Theory formulated in Heisenberg's Un-
certainty Principle noted earlier (p.46 ) . It reflects the 
notion that whilst trying to establish the position of a par-
/ 
r 
ticle in atomic physics, the very act of observation changes 
its position and hence its position cannot be formulated with 
certainty. This circular aspect of complementarity fascinated 
Bohr and in order to elucidate it he drew heavily on William 
James' vivid descriptions of the impossibility of observing 
streams of thoughts and feelings introspectively (Ja~er, 1966). 
If a person t.ries to observe what he is thinking about, at the very 
! I 
I i 
moment he is reflecting on a particular subject he introduces 
changes in the way his thoughts are proceeding. James (1980, 
cited in Jammer, 1966) illustrates this phenomenon as follows: 
The attempt at introspective analysis in 
these cases is in fact like seizing a spinning 
top to catch its motion, or trying to turn up 
the gas guickly enough to see how the darkness 
looks. 
(p .. 179) 
Apart from introspectionism, examples in psychology of this 
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•circular• notion of complementarity have frequently been n~ted 
(Bohr, 1958; von Franz, 1972; Bergstein, 1972). The example 
dealt with by all three of these authors is the reciprocally 
inhibiting relationship that exists between the conscious and 
the unconscious. In order to study the unconscious it must 
be made conscious, and then one is no longer strictly observ-
ing the original object of study, the unconscious. Another 
example comes from Bergstein (1972) who suggests that circular 
complementarity exists in the study of the psychogenesis of 
logical and physical concepts (cognition) . Not until verbal 
contact between child and investigator has been established is 
it possible to transcend mere behaviouristic analysis and get 
real information about the psychical world of the child; but 
the more firm the verbal contact becomes, the more the investi-
gator loses sight of the original object of study, the genesis 
of language acquisition upon which logidal and physical concepts 
are based. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this sub-section, the conscious/ 
unconscious type of complementary relationship (i.e., circular 
complementarity) is not of direct relevance to this thesis. 
In spite of this, the circular aspect of complementarity has 
been dealt with in some detail here because its examples high-
light the phenomenon of reciprocity and inverse relationships. 
In addition, it is important to clearly differentiate it from 
parallel complementarity which is of direct relevance to this 
thesis. From the above examples, it should be evident that 
circular complementarity relates to the interaction of a single 
observational arrangement anditsobject of study. The notion 
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of parallel complementarity, on the other hand, involves the 
complementary relationships that exist between multiple obser-
vational arrangementsofthe same object. In parallel complemen-
tarity, diverse observational arrangements (viewpoints, 
theoretical orientations or whatever other designation you 
like to give them) stand in reciprocally inhibiting relation-
ships to each other. And what this means in practical terms, 
is that the setting up of one experimental arrangement will 
interfere destructively (i.e., inhibit) the setting up of 
any other experimental arrangement. 
The point that is being made here in the language of complemen-
tarity is the. same one that we highlighted earlier with the 
common sense motorcycle and card playing·examples. The adoption 
of one view of the motorcycle necessarily reciprocally inhibits 
the adoption of any alternate view of the motorcycle; one set 
of rules for a card game necessarily interferes destructively 
with the adoption of an alternate set of rules such that they 
cannot be played simultaneously. If one chooses route A to 
climb to the top of the mountain this necessarily precludes the 
choice of route B. Arbitrary shifting between routes will 
result in a chaotic situation which will destroy a systematic 
arrival at one's d~stinati6n. 
Now none of the above difficulties would arise if there were 
only one possible route or viewpoint. It seems, however, that 
where the object of study is so complex and multiplicatively 
determined as in microphysics and psychology, there will always 
be noticeable circular complementarity (uncertainty that makes 
a practical difference in its observational arrangements) 
as well as parallel complementarity (a pluralism of complement-
ary descriptions) . "Pluralism and indeterminism" wrote James 
(cited in Jammer', 1966, p. 177), "seem to be but two ways of 
stating the same thing." From our discussion here it is 
possible to expand on James' statement and suggest that 
indeterminism (i.e., uncertainty of the object), pluralism and 
complementarity imply each other and are three ways of indi-
cating the same thing. 
It is evident, therefore, that the core epistemological issue 
with which we are dealing here, apart from plurality (multiple 
theories), is that of indeterminism. It can be expanded on in 
the following way. As we already know from complementarity, 
observations of objects are understood to be inextricably 
coupled to their observational arrangements. The nature of an 
object therefore can never be totally determined (known) in and 
of itself. In other words, the nature of the object is always 
seen to be determined in some degree by the observational 
(theoretical) arrangement. Now in the study of large objects 
in physics the effect of this uncertainty is not noticeable for 
practical purposes. Prior to Quantum physics, therefore, it was 
60 
possible to assume that one had a single description that was 
identical with the object of study, i.e., a totally determined 
object. With the greater complexity·of the phenomenon of 
study encountered in microphysics, however, the effect of 
uncertainty was found to be much more pronounced. A single 
description was no longer possible, multiple descriptions 
were necessary, and the effect of the descriptor had also to 
be taken into account. 
Now the crucial pragmatic consequence of indeterminism of 
particular relevance to this thesis is as follows. Since 
multiple observations do not exist in their own right without 
reference to their observational arrangements, each one of 
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these complementary observations or descriptions-of the object 
must include a clear specification of the whole experimental 
arrangement. In short, where a scientific endeavour demands 
multiple descriptions for practical purposes, the object can-
not exist unambiguously without a clear unambiguous definition 
of its subject (Bergstein, 1972). A description of the handle-
bars of the motorcycle, for example, is incomplete unless 
accompanied by a description of the angle from which it is 
viewed. Since more than one game is possible with a pack of 
cards, play will be chaotic unless there is a clear unambiguous 
definition of rules for the diverse games. 
2.2.3 Summary of Epistemological Implications 
_At this point, it is :q.ecessary to summarise the epistemological 
principles that have emerged from our discussion of Niels Bohr's 
i ! 
philosophy of complementarity. 
These are as follows: 
(1) The subject~object relativity of theories. 
This explains the fundamental indeterminate nature of 
objects, and the need for a plurality of descript~ons 
in the study of complex phenomena such as encountered 
in psychology and microphysics. 
(2) Complementary relationships between theories. 
This implies ·that theoretical accounts are contradictory 
and mutually destructive to each other if used simul-
taneously. The contradictions between theories do not 
represent real contradictions within the object of study 
itself. They exist because theories are necessarily 
limited, subjective interpretations of the reality, and 
are not the reality itself. 
(3) The need for unambiguous descriptions of theoretical 
(observational) arrangements. 
This occurs because an object can only be understood in 
relation to the subjective viewpoint from which it is 
studied. When there is a plurality of views on the same 
object the nature of each subjective standpoint assumes 
importance and cannot be dismissed. 
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It is evident that central to the above three principles ex-
tracted from complementarity, is the subjective factor in the 
process of theorizing. This human or psychological factor will 
now be taken up and expanded on in terms of psychological theory. 
2.3 PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND CON.PLEMENTARITY 
The complementarity epistemology has brought physics and psych-
ology very close together by emphasizing the fact that obser-
vations and all knowledge are rooted in the psyche. This is a 
viewpoint upheld by psychologists working within a dialectical 
framework (Kelly, 1955; Jung in Jabbbi, 1974; Piaget, 1979 ) • 
Now if all knowledge is rooted in the psyche, then it is evident 
thattheories of the psyche may, if it is within their range 
of convenience, be able to contribute to theories of knowledge. 
An emphasis is placed on contribute because it is not being 
suggested here that a psychological theory should replace 
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the complementarity thesis. The latter is clearly a metatheory, 
and it would become clumsy to use a psychological theory as a 
new metatheory for all of psychological science including itself. 
However, it is felt that psychological theories can contribute 
insights on the nature of theorizing of relevance to complement-
arity. 
It is not within the scope of this thesis to make a comprehensive 
analysis of all the links with complementarity and psychological 
theories. For example, the genetic epistemology posed. by Jean 
Piaget would lend itself well to comparisons with the complement-
arity epistemology. The reason for the choice of theorists here 
(Jung and Kelly) is because they have concerned themselves with 
the nature of theorizing in psychopathology and psychotherapy 
in particular. By examining their contribution we will auto-
matically stay close to our central theme which is to link 
complementarity with problems in psychotherapy. The scope 
of this thesis limits us to a cursory examination only of 
potential implications from these authors' theories. 
2.3.1 Jung's Concept of the Archetype and Theory of Types 
The parallelism in ideas that has evolved between microphysics 
and psychology is for Jung quite explicable in terms of his 
theoretical concept of.the archetype (Von Franz, 1972). 
Archetypes are the common inherited patterns of emotional and 
mental behaviour in all men. By means of this concept it is 
possible to elaborate on the way in which the observer is pre-
sent in the expression of scientific concepts. Because of these 
innate tendencies, the archetypes, man is induced to find expla-
n~tionsofphenomena in particular ways. Thus irrespective of 
what aspects of the universe, he observes, he is also to some 
extent "encountering himself" (in the phrase of Werner Heizen-
berg, quoted in Von Franz, 1972). Thus during the development 
of concepts within different disciplines it is not surprising 
that similar problems arise. It is not surprising, inaddition, 
if similar resolutions to these problems will also evolve. 
A clear example of this, noted earlier (Section 2.1), is Jung 
and Bohr's identical use of Einstein's principle of relativity 
to address the multiple theory problem in their respective 
sciences. 
Recent work on Jung's theory of psychological types (Groesbeck, 
1978; Witzig, 1978) highlights another concept of ,)ling's which 
has epistemological significancefor this thesis. The theory 
of types Jung has stated "will be a great help in understanding 
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the wide variations 1 that occur as well as a clue to the funda-
mental differences2 in the psychological theories that occur" 
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(Jung, 1921, quoted in G.roesbeck, 1.978, p.2,9). The psychological 
typesaredynamically defined (Adler, 1967, in Groesbeck, 1978), 
as the polaristic :!_:>sychic patterns of behaviour and adjustment 
in people which stand in complementary·relationships to each 
other. It is Jung's suggestion that all psychologicaL theories 
van be viewed from the oerspective .. of the different psychological 
J,; ' 
types. The best-known of these types are the complementary 
(i.e., polaristic) attitude types of introversion and extra-
version, and the complementary function types of thinking, 
sensation, feeling and intuition • . 
What is of importance to us here is the dynamic relationship 
that exists between the fact of complementary psychological 
types and the development of diverse complementary·approaches 
to psychotherapy. Complementarity is defined by Jung as the 
'more or less' mechanical situation of inverse relationships 
between things (1945, para.545). An~ a closely associated term 
is compensation which he defines as the psychological mechanism 
for the expression of these complementary relationships (1945, 
para.545). In accordance withthis terminology, Witzig (1978) 
suggests that historically the development of various approaches 
to psychotherapy has resulted from the compensatory expression 
of the different complenentary functions described in the typ-
ology. An elaboration of wha·t he means by this suggestion is 
as follows: 
1 ' 2 
Had the informational/cognitive approach of the 
early 20th century psychotherapy proved adequate 
for treating all cases, psychoanalysis need never 
Author's emphasis 
have faced alternative treatment modalities. 
With his emphasis on birth, order, family constell-
ation, and the development of social interest, 
Adler's system seems much more extraverted than 
orthodox psychoanalysis which focusses on intra-
psychic sexual conflicts and retains the couch 
as the treatment method least intruded on by 
outside influences .... Jung also saw fit to 
introduce an extraversive element into his psycho-
therapeutic approach by facing his patient " 
The feeling-Gominant confrontational/conative 
therapies made their appearance in their extraverted 
version by way of Moreno's psychodrama groups and 
their introverted approach with the client-centred 
therapy of Carl Rogers. Both methods were pre-
scribed as antidotes for a presumably narrow moral-
istic and technological thinking." 
(p.324-325) 
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By the 1930's, Witzig suggests, all of Jung' s complementary psycho-· 
logical t:_;pes had found their compensatory .expression in the various 
psychotherapeutic modalities. He goes on to propose a four-
fold classification of current psychotherapeutic modalities 
according to Jungian feel~ng types in the following form: 
(1) Thinking (informational/cognitive) types include psycho-
analysis, rational-emotive, educational and transactional app-
roaches; (2) Intuitive (symbolic/intuitive) types include those 
approaches which emphasize phantasy, meditation, brainstorming 
and any other technique which attempts to transcend reason or 
sensory input; (3) Sensation (sensory/experiential) types in-
elude most occupational, gestalt, bioenergetic and behaviour 
modification therapies; and, finally, (4) Feeling (confron-
tation/conative) types include encounter and T-group modalities, 
supportive-ventilative procedures and the client-centred 
approach of Carl Rogers. 
Witzig suggests that most psychotherapeutic methods utilize 
more than one of the above orienting function types, and that 
like the individual types upon which his classification of 
the therapies is modelled, there is no thoroughly pure therapy 
type. He argues, however, that one of the four functions will 
tend to dominate as the primary tool to induce psychological 
health. And there will always be an attitude or feeling 
orientation which is most lacking in a therapeutic system 
and which differentiates it from other therapies. This least 
dominant function is necessarily excluded from a therapy mod-
ality in many instances suggests Witzig, because its presence 
detracts from the curative influence of its oppositional 
dominant function. For example, an informational/cognitive 
orientation such as Ellis' rational-emotive therapy necessarily 
regards feelings as deceptive distractions to a rational re-
organization of someone's life. A sensory/experiential 
orientation such as gestalt therapy, on the other hand, regards 
any intrusion of the rational thinking function as destructive 
to its sensation therapeutic stance. The informational/ 
cognitive psychoanalytic therapy type stands in opposition 
to a sensory/experiential behaviour therapy type. 
At this point it is necessary to draw attention to the emer-
gence of an apparent contradiction. The road to individuation 
(psychic balance and health) for Jung is in terms of a union of 
the various function.types within the individual (Groesbeck, 
1978). Yet as VJitzig has pointed out the curative power of 
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the psychotherapies is via a splittinq or differentiation of 
function types between the various psychotherapy modalities. 
The resolution of this paradox is fundamentally the resolution 
of the philosophy of complementarity. Each different therapy 
type has a complementary service to perform with regard to 
an ultimate union of the types within the individual. The in-
discriminate mixing of these therapies without regard to 
type is potentially destructive to their separate effects. 
Preliminary research in this area indicates that variations 
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in effectiveness of treatment do occur as a result of variations 
in relationships between complementary therapy types and the 
personality types of client and therapist (Witzig, 1978). 
For example, extraverts compared to introverts show a more 
favourable response to an extravert psychotherapy type such 
as ~roup psychotherapy. Another suggestion from research is 
that a congruous matching of therapy and individual type is 
a supportive alternative and should be used to establish an 
infirm dominant function. Once the dominant function is well-
established, a complementary approach may be used for persons 
ready and desirous of personal growth through development of 
an inferior function. 
It is clear that even down to the use of the identical termin-
ology ('complementary relationships' and 'complementarity') 
the Jungian perspectives presented here are supportive of the 
three epistemological tenets of Niels Bohr's philosophy of 
complementarity laid down on p. 62. The theory of archetypes 
proposes the idea of a genetic potentiality to theorize in 
particular ways and thereby adds dimension to our understanding 
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of the subjective nature of theories. It provides in particular 
an explanation for the parallel epistemological problems en~ 
countered in two such different disciplinesaspsychology and 
physics. The theory of types provides an important additional 
dimension on which psychotherapy approaches stand in contra-
dictory, mutually exclusive relationships to each other. As 
noted previously, psychoanalysis and behaviour therapy contra-
diet each other in termsofthe dialectical-demonstrative strat-
egies of theorizing dimension. Now in addition, we note that 
they are mutually incompatible in terms of Jung's oppositional 
thinking-sensation typology dimension. We have commented that 
rational-emotive and gestalt therapies are also in opposition 
with regard to the complementary thinking-sensation functions. 
In the same way it would be possible to go on and note multiple 
other contradictions between approaches on the typology dimensi6n. 
Finally, research that suggests differential therapeutic ef-
fects dependent on therapy type, lends strong support to the 
complementarity requirement of unambiguous descriptions of 
theoretical orientation. It provides an empirical example of 
how the isolation of important differences between approaches 
alerts one to the power of their independent effects. Con-
versely it suggests, in line with the complementarity philo-
~ 
sophy, that haphazard combinations of approaches across the 
boundaries of such oppositional dimensions would be mutually 
-~-. 
destructive to the power of their therapeutic effects. 
Groesbeck suggests that Jung's typology is a critical tool 
which can help reduce the chaotic confusion in psychotherapy. 
The epistemological nature of its tool as we have seen above 
is in keeping with the principles of complementarity. In a 
broader sense, therefore, what we have encountered here is 
the way in which complementarity can help to reduce confusion 
in psychotherapy. 
2.3.2 Kelly's Personal Construct Theory 
The nature of Kelly's theoretical orientation was to do what 
he felt most other psychological theories had not done, and 
that was to account for the behaviour of the man who devises 
and uses these very theories (Kelly, 1955). The model of man 
he presents is that of man the scientist. Man functions in 
his everyday life, according to Kelly, by means of a con-
tinuous process of hypothesis testing, theory construction 
and reconstruction. His model includes, therefore, a theoryl 
of the structure of theories and how they are used. This makes 
his work of particular relevance to us here. Pertinent fea-' 
tures of his psychological model of theorizing are extracted 
from Rychlak, 1981; Shetter, 1975; Bannister and Fransella, 
1974 and Kelly, 1955, and are outlined below. 
According to Kelly, when a person looking at events in his 
life notices a series of recurring events which seem repetitive, 
he places an interpretation on this predictable aspect of his 
experience. This process is termed 'construing', and the 
interpretation is termed the 'construct'. Constructs are the 
patterns which human beings create to fit onto the events of 
life. Figure 3, p.71 (adapted after Rychlak, 1981, p.715) is a 
70 
CONSTRUCT 




LIFE . EVENTS 
/(:). / y CONSTRUCT C 
/ 
/ 
FIGURE 3 ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE SAME LIFE EVENTS 
(adapted after Rychlak, 1981, p.715) 
J,=k"'"JIAVIOURAL 0 
ffiNSTRUCI' ~' 
I\B7 PSYCHODYNAMIC VI CDNSTRUCT 
71 
(Focus on · \ "' 
syrrptom) 
\ 









ALTERNATIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTS ON STUTTERING 
scheme of three construing minds A, B and C. It illustrates 
the subject-object interdependence which is the essence of 
Kelly's construal process. As depicted in the scheme, none 
of the three construing minds achieve a construct which is 
identical with the reality of the life events which are being 
construed. Constructs are only ever symbolizations and 
approximations to the reality. 
Now A and B, for example, will find it difficult to communicate 
because they are viewing the world from two different pers-
pectives. In order to communicate, theycould each learn to 
construe the life events from the alternative viewpoint as 
well. This would represent a situation of empathy between 
minds A and B. Without losing the ability to construe from 
their own positions, they are capable of stepping into an 
alternate construing position. On the otherhand, A could leave 
his position altogether and adopt B's position or vice versa, 
or they could develop a third position C which they could share 
and which is neither A nor B. It may have elements of A and B 
but the new constellaiton is more than just those elements 
combined and represents a totally new reconstruction C. As 
is depicted on Figure 3, the new viewpoint is not just ad hoc 
bits of a square and a triangle, it is a circle, a new inte-
gral system all of its own. The communication alternatives 
suggested here are only possible by virtue of the fact that 
each perspective is an intergrated clearly articulated system 
of its own. 
The term construct can operate at many different levels of 
complexity, a higher order superordinate construct will be 
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made up of many lower order constructs. All constructs, how-
ever, have the same fundamental characteristics which are de-
fined by Kelly in the form of corollaries. Those of relevance 
here are the dichotomy, fragmentation and range corollaries. 
The dichotomy corollary will be dealt with first and in some 
detail, since it has a particularly important contribution 
to make. 
A person's construct system, according to Kelly, is composed 
of a finite number of dichotomous elements. What this 
means is that by definition a construct always has two poles, 
a pole of affirmation and a negative pole. Such a thing as 
a construct (viewpoint or perspective on something) only exists 
by virtue of the fact of the inclusion of certain aspects 
and the reciprocal exclusion of other aspects. It is only 
possible to construe white,· for example, by virtue of what is 
I 
not white. And it is only possible to construe extraversion 
by virtue of including aspects which belong to it and ex-
cluding other aspects which are negated by the term (i.e. 
those that go to make up the opposite pole of introversion) . 
Implicit in the construal of any set of events is the inclusion 
and exclusion of certain elements in relation to that set of 
events, within a particular context. In terms of construals 
(theories) within the context of psychotherapy, we have al-
ready noted in this work several examples of this. We have 
noted, for exawpl~::, the mutually excluding dichotomous con-
struct dimensions of Rychlak's dialectical-demonstrative 
strategies of reasoning, and of Jung•s thinking-sensation 
typologies. And both of these in turn, as we have also not~d, 
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contribute to dichotomous relations in psychodynamic and 
behaviour therapies. A dialectical, thinking-typed psycho-
dynamic orientation stands in a mutually destructive, com-
plementary relationship with a demonstrative, sensation-
typed behavioural therapy. It is useful at this point to 
expand further on the latter example. 
Figure 4 (p. 71) is Figure 3 re-schematized in terms of concrete 
psychotherapy examples. Construing mind A represents a be-
havioural perspective and construing mind B a psychodynamic 
view on a set of life events which for argument's sake we 
will denote as the psychopathology of stuttering. In simple 
terms, a behavioural construal of the symptomatic behaviour 
(the stutter) is that of a conditioned anxiety response 
maintained by avoidance behaviour. A psychodynamic construal 
of the stutter on the other hand, is that of an external 
manifestation of an underlying conflict that has been re-
pressed. The logical deduction for treatment from the behav-
ioural perspective is to focus directly on the symptom whose 
cause is known and can be demonstrated (a behavioural, dem~ 
onstrative approach) . In direct opposition is the logical de-
duction for treatment from the psychodynamic perspective 
which is not to focus on the symptom, but to focus rather on 
uncovering the underlying conflict which is unknown and will 
only become known through a dialectical psychotherapy process 
(a psychodynamic, dialectical approach). 
At the level of technique the behaviour therapist would work 
actively with issues revolving around the stutter using 
74 
75 
techniques such as systematic desensitization or the encourage-
ent of approach behaviour. The psychodynamic therapist would 
concentrate on analyzing the transference reactions and re-
sistances to the uncovering of painful unconscious material. 
A typical resistance in the patient would be his attempt to 
talk about the stutter and stuttering situations. To encourage 
talk about the stutter necessitated by the behavioural tech~ 
nique (focus on symptom) is to play into the very hands of 
the resistance one is trying to eliminate in terms of the 
psychodynamic technique (defocus on symptom) . Here we can 
clearly see in terms of the language of personal construct 
theory how the experimental set up for one set of observations 
interferes destructively with the experimental set up for 
the other set of observations. The important point is that 
there will always be aspects of constructs which will negat'e 
aspects of other constructs within the same context (in this 
case, the context of theories of psychotherapy), or they 
would not exist as separate constructs. And two constructs 
cannot be combined and used together simultaneously as in 
eclecticism because each will be destructive to the other's 
effects. 
Up to now, we have been focussing on the mutually excluding 
differences between constructs or approaches. This does not, 
however, deny the fact that there may be similarities between 
approaches. And it 'is important to note at this point that 
precisely because different psychotherapy approaches or 
constructs belong to the same higher-level construct, i.e. 
psychotherapy, there will inevitably be a number of commonalities 
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between approaches. FOr example, there will always be a 
' 
therapist and a client in a relationship who meet at regular 
intervals, and the therapist will always do such things as . 
listen empathically, ask questions and make interpretations 
about the problem in terms of his theoretical orientation. , 
What identifies a single psychotherapy approach or construct, 
however, within the larger common construct of the whole of 
psychotherapy, is the fact that it has elements that stand 
in opposition to certain elements of all other single psycho-
therapy approaches within the larger common psychotherapy con-
text. It is these less surface and more intricate contra-
dictory elements that give identity to the separate approaches. 
We have drawn attention to the above state of affairs at an 
earlier stage by means of our card playing example. Relatively 
gross commonalities will be evident, we suggested, even to 
the unsophisticated observer of various card games. It is 
only the person who is initiated into the rules of card games 
who will detect the finer details of the mutually excluding 
differences between the different games or, as we have been 
attempting to illustrate here in Kellian terms, between the 
different constructions of psychotherapy. Kelly's personal 
construct dichotomy corollary serves to highlight the fact 
that commonalities between constructs are relatively trivial. 
' 
It is the oppositional, dichotomous aspects between constructs 
which differentiate them, and provide the exclusive information 
about how best to construe and therefore play the therapy games. 
Two additional corollaries which have relevance here will be 
dealt with briefly viz. the range and fragmentation corollaries. 
The range corollary states that a construct is convenient for 
the anticipation of a limited range and focus of events only. 
View A (cf. Figure 3), for example, i~ not capable of taking 
the perspective of B or C simultaneously. Each viewpoint 
is restricted to its own limited focus on the set of events~ 
The fragmentation corollary states that without a clear~y 
defined construct on events,,these events will suffer from 
apparent inconsistency and have no meaning. In other words, 
without the constructions A, B or C (cf. Figure 3), the 
set of life events has no consistent meaning, and the more 
clearly defined those constructions are, the less fragmented 
and more coherent the understanding of those life events will 
become. 
It is evident that from the Kellian psychological perspective 
we have found support yet again for the fundamental epistem~ 
ological tenets of the complementarity thesis. Firstly, as 
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with complementarity, Kelly's theory is based on the funda-
mental subject-object interdependency of observations and the 
symbolic nature of theories. The remarkable parallelism between 
the Kellian and complementarity schematizations of this are 
obvious (cf. Figures 2 and 3, pp. 49, c- 71) ~· · Secondly, his dichotomy 
corollary draws attention to the inherently contradictory and 
mutually exclusive nature of theoretical constructions. 
Thirdly, the dichotomy and limited range corollaries together 
preclude, as complementarity does, the notion of one grand all-
encompassing construction of a comp~ex phenomenon. And finally, 
the fragmentation corollary supports the complementarity notion 
of the need for unambiguous definitions of theoretical 
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constructions. In Kellian terms, life events are understood 
not to have meaning in and of themielves, but only acquire 
meaning via the systematic construals which are placed upon 
them and therefore can never be totally known (i.e. determined). 
In sum, psychological insights from the theories of Jung and 
Kelly have been examined in relation to Niels Bohr's principles 
of complementarity. The uncanny parallel insights which have 
emerged independently from each of these three different orien-
tations (Bohr, Jung and Kelly) suggest epistemological con-
ditions surrounding the nature of our theories that need to 
be taken very seriously. 
2.4 SUMMARY AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL INDICATIONS FOR THE PRACTICE 
OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 
This section has proposed Niels Bohr's philosophy of comple-
mentarity as a metatheoretical alternative to guide psycho-
therapy practice. It was pointed out that this is the gen-
erally accepted solution to the problem of diverse theories 
in physics, and that it has particular relevance to a 
similar problem in psychology. The epistemological principles 
of complementarity corroborated by the psychological theories 
of Jung and Kelly, have been isolated as follows: ( 1) the 
subject-object relativity and indeterminate nature of theories, 
(2) complementary relationships between theories, and (3) 
the need for unambiguous descriptions of theoretical arrange-
ments. The next step is to bring these tenets of complementarity 
together with the practice of psychotherapy and consider the 
implications. 
From the above principles, 
psychotherapy practice can 
the following indications for 
be deduced: 01 )'-;a ~urality of 
a29roaches is necessary in order to achieve a more complete 
__..---- --· ,, 
I . 
description of the phenomenon, ·(2) .since approaches stand 
\ 
in complementary relationships to one another, that is they 
. --have elements which are mutually destructive to each other, 
__..-
they must be used separately and not mixed together haphazard-
ly, and .(3) there is a need for unambiguous descriptions~of 
theoretical approaches. The latter point suggests tightening 
of conceptual relationships between theory and method within 
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approaches, and decreasing blurred boundaries between approaches 
through greater awareness of the impact of differences between 
approaches. 
In essence, the complementarity resolution starts off from 
the same point as Lambley•s argument for eclecticism. This 
I 
point is the fundamental subject-object relativity of theories, 
the consequence of which is an inherently anarchic situation 
which does not allow us ever to totally determine or know 
our object of study. From here on, however, the two argu-
ments diverge. Lambley argues that because of this inherent-
ly anarchic situation we have permission to throw theroetical 
tightness away and become as conceptually anarchic or ambiguous 
as we like. This forms the basis of his argument for a 
haphazard mixture of approaches (i.e., eclecticism). His 
position ignores the problem of contradictions between 
theories, and encourages the very conceptual looseness that 
has been identified as contributing to e~s-~::mological c~-­
in the science. 
The epistemology of complementarity highlights the irration-
ality of such an eclectic position and argues in.the exact 
opposite direction. It is precisely because of the inherent 
anarchy and ambiguity of indeterminism that we have to 
strive as far as possible for a position of non-ambiguity 
in order to avoid confusion in the science. In addition, the 
problem of mixing fundamentally contradictory theories is a 
major feature of the complementarity thesis in contrast to 
the eclectic position where it has been ignored. 
If we consider the major problem areas identified in Section 
I, it is evident that the complementarity thesis provides the 
most promising metatheoretical resolution we have encountered 
yet for bridging the gap between diverse theories and practice. 
-
1 Firstly, it has the formal status of theory and therefore can 
"'--... 
:provide logical deductions for practice. Secondly, the pointers 
\.. / 
it provides are towards conceptual tightening within and between 
psychotherapy approaches, which is in a direction that promises 
decreased chaos and confusion and a more consequential science. 
~ ~JAnd, finally, its most important contribution is to promote 
the separate use of diverse approaches specifically tQ a'void 
the mutually destructive possibilities consequent on a simul-
taneous application of contradictory approaches. 
' In the final section, we will examine how these indications 







In Section 2, Niels Bohr's philosophy of complementarity was 
proposed as a metatheoretical alternative to guide practice 
in psychotherapy. From its philosophy, principles for practice 
were deduced. In essence the indications are for the separate 
use of a plurality of approaches, and unambiguous theoretical 
descriptions. The aim of this section is to critically ex-
amine practice alternatives for psychotherapy from the per-
spective of these principles • 
3. 1 BRIEF HISTORY OF PLURALIS!-~ IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 
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Garfield (1982) has usefully summarized pluralistic versus 
sectarian developments in the field of psychotherapy as follows. 
In the 1940's and 1950's the field was clearly dominated by 
psychoanalysis and psychodynamic emphases, with other approaches 
to psychotherapy having very little impact. In the early 1960's 
a survey carried out on members of the Division of Clinical 
Psychology of the American Psychological Association (Kelly, 
1961, cited in Garfield), showed that less sectarian develop-
ments were afoot. 41% of respondents indicated that they ad-
hered to a psychodynamic orientation, but 40% classified 
themselves as eclectic (in the sense of adhering to more than 
one psychotherpaeutic principle), and less than 10% indicated 
\ 
a behaviour theory preference. 
Fifteen years later, in a similar survey undertaken by Garfield 
and Kurtz (1976), psychodynamic preferences had declined to 
19% whilst 55% of respondents now indiqated eclectic prefer-
ences. The percentage selecting a behavioural orientation 
remained much the same at 10%. 'Eclectic preferences' on 
analysis (Garfield and Kurtz, 1977) refer to any number of 
different combinations of approaches. The most common (25% 
of a sample of eclectics) was a joint use of psychodynamic 
and learning approaches. An eclectic preference, therefore, was 
found to include any type of modification or combination of 
existing approaches, sometimes given "the more dignified 
terms, convergence or integration" (Garfield, 1982, p.612). 
The upsurge of pluralistic approaches in the 1960's parallels 
the beginning of an upsurge at that time of the growth of 
multiple new forms of psychotherapy. In the early 1960's, 
Garfield (1982) listed 60 different types, in 1975 130 diff-
erent forms are reported (Report of the Research Task Force 
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of the National Institute of Mental Health, 1975, cited in 
Garfield), and more recently, in 1980, between 150-120 varieties 
have been isolated (Marshall, 1980; Herink, 1980, cited in 
Garfield). These developments can be understood within the 
context of influential contributions to the zeitgeist of 
theoretical relativism that emerged at that time viz., Kuhn's 
celebrated work on the structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(1962), and Bohr's Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge (1958). 
The problem in psychotherapy .. therefore, we would like to 
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argue, is not in the adoption of a relativistic position 
per se, since this is perfectly in line with modern epistem-
ological developments. The problem is that the development 
has taken place in a very haphazard and unstructured manner. 
Goldfried (1982) points out that although the hope of finding 
some consensus amongst the plurality of psychotherapies 
dates back 50 years, it is only within the past 5 to 10 years 
that it has begun to develop into a more clearly delineated 
area of interest. It does not have as yet any uniform title 
for indexing in bibliographic sources. The field has adopted, 
it seems, a pluralistic approach without examining in a coherent 
manner, as Physics has done, the philosophical indications 
with regard to practice. The remaining pages of this thesis 
will indicate how a deeper understanding of the relativistic 
viewpoir.t~ as presented here in the form of complementarity, 
can give structure to our pragmatic developments. 
3.2 REDEFINITION OF TERMS 
It is evident, on examining the psychotherapy literature, 
that it is characterized by an exceedingly undifferentiated 
use of concepts to describe its pluralistic pragmatic trends. 
In a recent series of publications which have comprehensively 
reviewed contribtuions to the literature in this area (Garfield, 
1982; Goldfried, 1982; Kendall, 1982 and Wachtel, 1982), the 
terms 'eclectic', 'integration' and to a lesser extent, 
'complementary' are used indiscriminately to cover the entire 
range of rapprochement possibilities in response ~o a 
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pluralistic science as though they are all one and the same 
thing. From the argument that has been developed here however, 
it is clear that from the same root situation of a plural-
istic science, the opposing pragmatic positions of eclecticism 
and complementarity have been argued (cf. the argument of com-
plementarity versus Lambley, Section 2.3.3). It is considered 
necessary, therefore, to redefine the three terms mentioned 
above (integration, eclecticism and complementary) in 
order to be alerted not to their synonymous aspects, but to 
In terms of this new definition 
; 
of terminology then, it will be possible to locate and 
critically comment on divergent pragmatic positions within 
the broad range of pluralistic trends. This is a crucial step 
which to our knowledge has not yet been undertaken· in the 
literature. 
In Table 1 , p. 86, we have listed common synonyms for the terms 
'integrate', 'eclectic' and 'complement'. From these terms 
it is possible to isolate a fundamental commonality of meaning 
which explains why they have been used synonymously in the 
psychotherapy literature. It is also possible, however, to 
identify important differences .. In common they have the broad 
meaning of "arranging together of diverse parts into a whole". 
Their differences in meaning relate to the manner in which 
these parts are brought together into a whole. It is 
clearly this differentiation which will have utility for dis-
tinguishing the manner in which different approaches are 
brought together in psychotherapy. 
TERM 




arrang'e, blend, orchestrate, symphonize, 
synthesize, unify, cease to segregate, 
find the integral of 
selective, assorted, mingled, mixed, 
diverse, not exclusive, borrowing past 
doctrines from different schools. 
supplement, counterpart, augment, multiply, 
enhance, enrich, make up deficiency, reci-
procal. 
TABLE 1 SYNONYMS (Webster's Collegiate Thesaurus, 









Synthesis of parts 
Mixture of unsynthesized parts 
Alternate combinations of wholes 
DIVERSE RAPPROCHEMENT POSSIBILITIES 
IN A PLURALISTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 
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Making use of the synonyms listed in- Table 1, we have denoted 
the terms integration, eclecticism and complementarity as 
follows: 
(1) Integration is defined as the bringing together of parts 
by synthesizing them into a blended new whole. The aspect 
particular to integration which is emphasized 'here is the 
notion of synthesis. This implies the loss of the inde-
pendent existence of the parts which are incorporated into 
a new independent and systematized whole. 
(2) Eclecticism is defined as the bringing together of parts 
in the form of an assorted mixture. The aspect that is 
emphasized here is that of an unsynthesized mixture. 
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This implies that the mixed parts retain their diversity 
because they are not systematized into a new unified whole. 
Definitions of eclecticism taken from the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica and A Dictionary of Philosophy- (Flew, 1979) 
support this particular use of the term: 
Eclecticism is the practice of selecting doctrines 
from different systems of thought without adopting 
a whole system from which each doctrine was derived. 
It is distinct from syncretism in that syncretism 
is the attempt to reconcile or combine systems, 
whereas eclecticism leaves the contradictions 
between systems unresolved. 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica) 
Eclecticism, the principle or practice of taking 
views from a variety of philosophical and other 
sources. The tendency is manifested in many 
individuals and systems that make no strenuous 
effort to create intellectual harmony between 
discrete elements. 
(Flew, 1979). 
(3) Complementarity, in opposition to both of the above terms, 
implies neither the loss of parts through synthesis las 
in integration), nor the mixing of parts without concern 
for the contradictions between parts (as in eclecticism). 
It brings parts together in the form of multiplacative 
combinations which respect the totality and reciprocal 
nature of the individual parts. 
It is suggested from the perspective of the above redefinition 
of terms, that the psychotherapist has three broad choices for 
action, viz. integration, eclecticism and complementarity. 
These are presented in Table 2, p•86 under the heading 'rapproche-
~entpo?sibilities'. The latter umbrella term is a non-res-
trictive term with regard to the manner of reconciliation of 
approaches which we have taken from the literature (Goldfried, 
1983). The use of 'therapeutic integration' as a heading 
for this area of interest, as in the Garfield/Wachtel Series 
(1982), is rejected here because of its semantic connotations 
of blending and synthesis which are in opposition to the 
pragmatic indications for both eclecticism and complementarity. 
It therefore has the potential of being misleading. 
Central trends in the literature will now be critically dis-
cussed within the rubric of this new terminilogy. The inten-
tion is not to produce another comprehensive review of the 
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literature as Goldfried (1982) has done, but rather to high-
light by means of relevant texts, the structure that can be 
given to an amorphous literature in terms of the conceptual 
clarification offered by complementarity. 
3.3. INTEGRATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
The integrationists reconciliatory drive in the face of diverse 
approaches to psychotherapy is towards a blending together of 
approaches into a single approach. This is exemplified in 
four different trends in the literature: (a) attempts to 
unite psychoanalytic and behaviour therapies, (b) the search 
for a new language for the psychotherapiesj (c) the search for 
commonalities amongst psychotherapies, and (d) the individual-
ised creative syntheses. 
3.3.1 The Integration of Psychoanalysis and Behaviour 
Therapy 
The very earliest attempts at integrating the psychotherapies 
were attempts to draw parallels between psychoanalysis and 
behavioural conditioning (French, 1933, cited in Goldfried, 
1982). Over the years this has been a recurrent theme in the 
literature (Marks and Gelder, 1966; Wolf, 1966; Ryle, 1978; 
Wachtel, 1982; Davis, 1983), and remains today by far the most 
sought after rapprochement combination (Garfield, 1977). 
Common ground between psychodynamic methods and behaviour 
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therapy, and the fact that one can translate aspects of the 
one approach into the language of the other, provide the 
rationale behind fhe many attempts at an integrative reconcil-
iation. In most cases, the motivation behind this movement 
is to be rid of the two different language systems and arrive 
at a more economic common language system which would do the 
work of both. 
In terms of complementarity it makes sense that parallels 
can be found concerning the object of study of the two diff-
erent language systems. After all, we are hypothesizing 
different views of he same object and, therefore, common ground 
such as this confirms the common object and serves in different 
l~nguage systems to sharpen our insight into the particular 
state of affairs we are viewing. For example, the parallel 
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that can be drawn between successive approximations (a behaviour 
therapy technique) and graded interpretations (a psychoanalytic 
technique), is an exciting finding. It serves to confirm to 
us that we are progressing along the right track. The inde-
pendent empirical support gained from each approach provides, 
at an academic level, a measure of reciprocal support. 
From the persepctive of complementarity however, this is where 
the usefulness should stop. These parallel techniques are 
deeply rooted in broader methodologies which are fundamentally 
contradictory. Successive approximations are part of an 
approach aimed at symptom removal, whereas graded interpretations 
are part of an approach which aims at uncovering the feelings 
underlying the symptom. In practice, therefore, the two 
( 
techniques are not interchangeable. In addition, the comple-
mentarity principles remind us that it is impossible to 
translate one language system into another in its totality 
because of th,e fundamental contradictions which· have differen.;.; 
tiated them as systems in the first place. Any language 
system arrived at by trying to translate one of these systems 
into the other, would necessarily mean giving up fundamental 
contradictory aspects of each system, and therefore would in 
effect be a third new language system. Such a move is not in 
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the interests of an economy of language systems,~and consequently 
ends up defeating its original purpose. 
Ryle (1978) has another suggestion ·to make which is to unite 
these two approaches (psychoanalysis and behaviour therapy) 
by means of an existing·third language system, that of cog-
nitive therapy. It is evident, howe.ver., that to write these 
two approaches in any language whatsoever, because of their 
mutually excluding properties, is an impossible task. The 
principles derived from complementarity alert us also to the 
limited range and convenience of ·our language systems. Accep-
tance of th_is often reduces the motivation to strive as the inte-
. 
grationists do, towards the impossible goal of an.all-encom-
passing theory. From the perspective of complementarity we 
wish to make full use of the differential potential of the 
alternate approaches. 
Emerging tentatively in the literature, are encouraging 
indications of the conclusions we have reached via complement-
arity concerning rapprochements between psychoanalysis and 
behaviour therapy. In spite of the existence of commonalities 
it is suggested (Marks and Gelder, 1966; Meyer in French, 
1933, cited in Goldfried, 1982; Yates, 1983) that there is 
the need for separate lines of inquiry and for the therapies 
to be used separately. This is because of their fundamental 
incompatibility. As highlighted by Dooley (1982), in his 
article on the Rogers versus Skinner, Day versus Giorgi de-
bates, the behaviourism and phenomenological 1 traditions in 
science have been shown by their own masters to be irreconcil-
able. It is time we moved onto modes of rapprochement which do 
not involve futile attempts to integrate dichotomous systems. 
3.3.2 A Reconciliatory Theoretical Language 
The search for a new language system to integrate therapies, 
as we have noted above, is born out of the urge to reduce the 
number of different language systems in the field by synthesizing 
them into one all-encompassing theory. And as suggested above, 
this is an unrealistic urge which ends up defeating its own 
purpose. It produces yet another new approach in need of years 
of refinement which cannot hope to synthesize in one system 
multiple contradictory approaches. Under this sub-section it 
remains only to point out that this trend is not limited to 
attempts at integrating psychoanalysis and behaviour therapy. 
Unger (1982), for example, engages in a similar self-defeating 
attempt to tackle the problem of psychological indeterminism 
by trying to unite biological and psychodynamic explanations 
of psychotherapy in a unitary theory of the passions. From 
1 Psychoanalysis falls under the rubric of phenomenology 
used in this broad sense. 
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the perspective of complementarity this does not provide a 
helpful solution. All that is gained is an additional theory 
for the already over~stocked market of psychological theoties, 
further aggravating rather than alleviating the indeterminism 
problem. 
3.3.3 Commonalities of Therapeutic Practice 
One of the most prevalent trends at present is without doubt 
the search for commonalities between. psychotherapies. This 
tendency is typically foun~ in general texts on counselling 
and the psychotherapies (e.g. Brammer and Shostrom, 1977; Ivey, 
Sinek and Downing, 1980). It emerges as a core issue in 
the recent review series on psychotherapy rapprochement . 
(Garfield, Goldfried, Kendall and Wachtel, 1982). Another 
author of note who has focussed on commonalities is Prochaska 
(1979). Typically what lies behind such a search is that it 
will make possible an a-theoretical orientation which will 
cut across all theories and encompass the common elements that 
are considered effective across a broad range of therapy 
approaches. 
The motivatior(·:behind such a trend is once again towards break-
ing down specialization and gaining a single mode of approach 
in reaction to the present state of confusion in a pluralistic 
science. There is hardly a need to repeat once again the 
fallacy of this wish. A new 11 transtheoretical orientation .. 
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as ·Prochaska calls it, can only be in the final analysis yet 
another new modality to add to the already overburdened plurality. 
( 
The philosophy of complementarity reminds us that there is 
no such thing as an autonomous orientation disconnected en-
tirely from a subjective standpoint on practice, and therefore 
there is no such thing as a naked non-theroetical_psycltother-
apy approach. 
_,..-
A typical argument of this group who seek to unite the thera-
pies through their commonalities, is that the effectiveness 
of therapy has more to do with common elements that with the 
theoretical explanations on which the different therapies 
are based. Their argument from Garfield (1982) and Goldfried 
(1982) is based on the following two factors: (a) a large 
body of research that suggests no differentiation in outcome 
between therapies, and (b) the fact that patients themselves 
tend to view their positive experiences in terms of common 
elements rather than on particular techniques. The common 
elements referred to here are summarized as follows: 
(1) The personality of the therapist himself, possibly 
the ability to inspire hope in the patient. 
(2) The patient being provided with the opportunity to 
talk to an understanding person~ 
(3) The provision of an alternative and more plausible 
way for the patient to understand his problems. 
It is this latter element (a new way for the patient to under-
stand his problem) which has particular relevance to our argu-
ment. It has been focussed on in the literature by those who, 
in line with complementarity, accept the inevitable presence 
of the observer variable (Kessel and McBrearty, 1967; 
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Lambley, 1971; Kovel, 1976; Rychlak, 1982). The point 
that is made clear by these authors is that what is most 
essentially common to all the psychotherapies is precisely 
. . 
the fact that they are different language systems (i.e. 
theoretical systems) which provide new ways for understanding 
the patient's problems. In other words, the major facilitative 
element, number 3 above, is the fact that the therapist pro-
vides the patient with a plausible way of understanding his 
problem via his particular theory. And a major contributing 
factor to the hope that the patient experiences (element 
number 1 above), is certainly the faith he has that the thera-
pist has a theoretical formula with scientific status to 
offer him in relation to his problem. 
It is possible to elaborate further on this theme and suggest 
that there is an extremely important facilitative element over-
looked in those commonly outlined as above, and that is the 
ability of the therapist to offer an integrated theoretical 
approach. A well-integrated, unambiguous approach will give 
the therapist the feeling of security which will inspire faci-
litative feelings of hope in the patient. Commensurate with 
this line of reasoning is research by Wollersheim (1982) and 
Kessel and McBrearty (1967). Wollersheim has found significant 
'rationale effects' as against no clear rationale, onmeasures 
tapping the confidence and faith in treatment and perception 
of the psychologist. And Kessel and McBrearty suggest that 
improvements in therapy are in accordance with value changes 
in the therapist's direction. If the therapist's value orien-
tation (part of which is necessarily his theoretical orien-
tation) is haphazard or non-existent, there will be no clear 
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direction towards which the patient can change. 
It is evident from what has been suggested here, that the 
basic rationale behind the search for commonalities mentioned 
earlier - the effectiveness of approaches is probably more to 
do with their common elements than with. the theoretical ex-
planations on which they are based - has been rendered ex-
tremely problematic in that it is inherently contradictory. 
The philosophy of complementarity reminds.us of the fundamental 
presence of the subjective (theoretical) factor. Eliminate 
the theoretical approach from your psychotherapy~ therefore, 
as these commonality integrationists wish to do, and you 
eliminate the most fundamental.of the facilitative common 
elements. 
As mentioned earlier, the search for commonalities is inspired 
to some extent by research results that fail to differentiate 
outcome between approaches. Metholological studies are 
indicating, however, that approaches do not converge on a 
common mixture of techniques (Witzig, 1928; Stiles, 1979). 
And the failure to differentiate between the outcome of app-
roaches in many studies is likely to be more a lack of· research 
sophistication and d~fficulties of research into psychotherapy, 
than proof that approaches are essentially the same (Bergin 
and Lambert, 1978). The other factor mentioned earlier which 
~ 
lends impetus to a focus on commonalities is that the patient 
experiences core transtheoretical elements (the personality 
of the therapist, hope, new understanding of the problem, etc.) 
as facilitative rather than the therapy techniques themselves. 
From our study of complementarity, the fallacy of this 
' 
reasoning is clear. As we have illustrated by means of the 
card playing analogy, the uninitiated observer would identify 
relatively gross commonalities between the games, but would 
have no way of differentiating the specialized rules that 
would enable him to observe the playing with any critical 
skill. Obviously, as psychotherapists, it is our theoretical 
sophistication that allows us the spectacles to detect what 
is actually occurring in the process of .psychotherapy by means 
of our techniques. This goes beyond.the patient's sub-
jective awareness of his position and is the facility which en-
ables us to assist in the process of psychotherapy change. 
In sum, it is clear from the perspective of complementarity 
that commonalities relative to differences in theoretical 
approaches have limited pragmatic relevance. The philosophy 
actively alerts us to the danger of overlooking differences 
and, conversely, to the therapeutic potential of making use 
of these differences. It is our view, therefore, in contrast 
to that of Garfield (1982) and Goldfried .(1982), that hope for 
advances in psychotherapy does not lie in the search for 
commonalities which has outgrown its usefulness and is ending 
up in a theoretical blind alley. It lies rather in the 
work of those who are starting to explore and harness the 
utility of the differences (e.g., Staples et al, 1975; 
Witzig, 1978; Stiles, 1979). Our view is strongly corro-
borated by Wilson (1982)., who states that therapeutic advances 
are more likely to result from rigorous attempts to discriminate 
between methods than from the identification of "superficial 
commonality among diverse therapeutic approaches" (p.325). 
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3.3.4 The Creative Synthesis Approach 
A final integrative trend to be dealt with is that of the 
individualized creative synthesis of the type proposed by 
Bramme~ and Shostrom (1977). These authors suggest that the 
psychotherapist has the following three choices £or practice: 
(1) to adopt a single theory which is limited because it 
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restricts the use of available data, (2) to develop an eclectic 
position with its concomitant negative aspects of an uncritical, 
unintegrated collection of what works for now, or ideally, 
(3) to strive for a personalized creative synthesis of theory 
and practice. What Brammer and Shostrom propose with the 
latter option is as follows: 
Each counsellor and psychotherapist must 
ultimately develop a point of view which is 
iniquely his own ... the •creative• element 
comes in .when the counsellor not only puts 
together concepts and practices from other 
theories in new ways, but also transforms 
them into ideas and methods which have con-
tinuing relevance for himself •••• The •syn-
thesis• element comes into the theory-building 
process as the counselor strives to integrate 
in incremental fashion what appear to be sep~ 
arate ideas and uncoordinated methods. He 
synthesizes dynamic and structured elements to 
form a basic personality model; he describes 
strategies and methods which follow from his 
assumptions and values. 
(p.33) 
Now this type of injunction is extremely idealistic as Brammer 
and Shostrom point out themselves. And, as with all idealisms, 
it is in opposition to what makes pragmatic sense. Its 
highly individualized stance is contrary to the notion of a 
community of scientists working in the same direction with a 
shared set of rules whicp is so vital for progress in science 
(Kuhn, 1962). In addition, the development of an integrated 
system takes years of highly creative work, usually by a group 
of people, and certainly does not lie within the capabilities 
or time available of the average practising psychotherapist. 
Unfortunately, what happens with such a notion .transferred 
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to thousands of undergraduate students, is that it becomes a 
rationalization and dignified label for·what in fact is an 
unfortunate compromise on theoretical purity, and for what is 
not a creative synthesis at all but an unsynthesized eclecticism. 
The problematic aspects of the latter will be explored in 
more detail in the following sub~section. 
It is evident that none of the four integration possibilities 
discussed here are feasible pragmatic alternatives in terms 
of complementarity. 
3.4 ECLECTICISM 
In direct contrast to integration which incorporates the notion 
of synthesis, eclecticism.is defined as the use of principles 
from different systems without any attempt to synthesize these 
principles in theoretical harmony. As mentioned previously, 
there has been an upsurge of eclectic preferences as against 
a sectarian orientation in recent years, with surveys noting 
minimal eclectic preferences in the 1940's, a rise to 45% in 
the 1950's, 60% in the 1970's and 65% in the 1980's (Garfield, 
1976; Larson, 1980, cited in Goldfried, 1982). In a follow-
up analysis of what was meant by those who stated 'eclectic 
preferences' Garfield (1977) found that psychoanalysis and be-
haviour therapy were the two orientations most· commonly com-
bined, but that there was a wide diversity of other combi-
nations. Some of the examples given by Garfield are 
behaviour therapy combined with any one of humanistic, Sulli- · 
vanian, Roger ian or rationa.l emotive therapy; humanistic com-
bined with psychoanalysis, nee-Freudian or Rogerian therapy. 
And this is to name only a few. 
From Garfield's study, we can see that the designation 
'eclectic' covers an infinitely wide range of combinations of 
approaches. In addition, there is no precise notion of what 
the eclectic does in practice apart from the fact that he is 
not committed to any one orientation, and tends to utilize 
aspects of more than one theoretical view. There is no indi-
cation from Garfield's study concerning the manner ·in which 
practitioners combine the different and often opposing view-
points. A study by Bradway et al (1978) shows that analytical 
psychologists use a wide variety of adjuncts to analytic 
psychology such as family, group, behaviour and sex therapies. 
These authors take note of whether the adjuncts are executed 
by the analysts themselves or referred. Their interest 
however appears to be only statistical, and as a theoretical 
issue the manner of execution is once again simply ignored. 
Outcome research studies which make use of an 'eclectic' 
group typically provide no additional precision on this 
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term (Wagman, 1979; Cohen, 1981; Koss, 1983). In sum, 
'eclectic psychotherapy' both by definition and in practice, 
is an idiosyncratic, theoretically unsystematized approach 
based on the use of a combination of techniques fr9m any num-
ber of contradictory therapeutic systems. The manner 
of combination is typically not addressed as an issue. 
It is possible to isolate two major factors as the basis for 
the eclectic approach. These are (1) anti-sectarianism, and 
(2) pragmatism in the face of a pluralist!~ science. The 
argument taken from major proponents of the orientation 
(Lazarus, 1968; Abramowitz, 1970; Lambley, 1970, 1971a; 
Garfield, 1982; Thorne in Goldfried, 1982), proceeds as 
follows: 
(1) Anti-sectarianism. Since research indicates very little 
differentiation between approaches, and since no one 
approach in its own right is felt to be entirely satis-
factory, it is considered unethical to withhold from the 
patient any techniques that may be beneficial. 
(2) Pragmatism. Eclecticism is an approach which claims 
to put helping and pragmatics first. Whatever works 
empirically is considered best and theoretical under-
standing can come later if at all since it is not of 
primary importance. Sin~e theoretical understanding 
takes a back seat, the problem of fundamental contra-
dictions between theories is ignored. 
It is interesting (although it should not be surprising) that 
the eclectic principles above are arrived at from philosophical 
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underpinnings which are a mixture of two diametrically opposed 
philosophical positions. These are the positions of radical 
relativism (a dialectical position) , and radical empiricism 
(a demonstrative position). The argument from the first of 
these, radical relativism, we have already dealt with in re-
lation to the work of Lambley (Section 1.2.2). In brief the 
argument is as follows. Note is taken of the inevitable pre-
sence of the subjective/observer factor in science. From 
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there is is argued that since objects of study can never be 
entirely determined or known, anything is possible theoretically, 
and a completely free (anarchic) choice of theories and method 
can reign. The argument from the second philosophical position, 
radical empiricism, proceeds as follows. The facts of nature 
can be totally known and exist in their own right without ref-
erence to the observer. And because of this, it is possible 
to dispense with theory. 
Now one can understand from the pragmatic mind of the eclectic 
how it is possible to put together these two opposing 
philosophical positions. Pragmatic consequences have been 
argued from each of these positions which are identical, i.e., 
that one can function freely without reference to theory~ 
From the perspective of complementarity, however, which strives 
for conceptual consistency and wishes to resolve contradictions, 
such a dichotomous mixture of philosophical underpinnings is 
unacceptable. 
It suggests to us that there is an inconsistent argument. From 
oppositional philosophical positions one should obviously deduce 
oppositional pragmatic indications. In Section 1.2.2 we 
suggested that Lambley's deduction to meet relativistic 
anarchy and ambiguity with increased anarchy is illogical. 
Complementarity, on the_other hand, provides the more rational 
solution of fighting anarchy by maximizing non-ambiguity and 
theoretical clarity. By introducing the epistemological prin-
ciples from complementarity into the equation, we acquire a 
consistent picture. Its relativistic pragmatic consequences 
are, as they should be, in oppositi-on to the a-theoretical 
pragmatic consequences of radical empiricism. And we would 
like to suggest that if the eclectics wish to adopt a non-
sectarian relativistic position, they cannot logically justify 
a simultaneous adherence to radical empiricism. From a rela-
tivistic viewpoint the influence of theoretical underpinnings, 
and this includes the problem of contradictions, simply has 
to be taken into account. 
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Another argument used by the eclectics to support their position, 
is to equate the pragmatic position of psychotherapy with 
that of medicine. Since medical science operates on a set of 
empirically verified principles of body functioning, it is 
argued that such an a-theoretical set of principles should be 
the goal also of psychotherapy. The parallel however is in-
herently false. This is due to the fact that medical practice 
is based on one fundamental model of bodily functioning, and 
therefore there is no basic contradiction in medical eclecticism. 
The position for psychotherapists is complicated by the lack 
of a unitary conceptualisation of the psychological functioning 
of the patient. Thus eclecticism in psychotherapy which 
draws on principles from diverse psychological models is of 
a different status to that of medicine. It is the lack of 
realisation of this fundamentally important difference which 
leads some psychotherapists to support an eclectic position. 
It should be clear then despite what the eclectics have argued, 
that both medicine and psychotherapeutic activities are ulti-
mately grounded in theory. Because of the indeterminate 
nature of psychological theories however, psychotherapists 
cannot afford to act as medical practitioners do as though 
they are autonomous of theory. 
We have examined up to now the rationale behind eclecticism 
as proposed by the adherents of this position themselves. 
Others who are critical of the position, however, suggest less 
dignified reasons which underlie the proliferation of this 
approach. Robertson (19 79) , for example, proposes that 
eclecticism is a confused response to the large number of 
approaches in psychotherapy which.takes the form of a dys-
functional over-inclusive urge to pull together the universe 
of possibilities. Wolman (1965) maintains that it is con-
ceptual confusion amongst psychotherapists in the face of 
multiple theories that lies behind the decision to act with-
out regard to theory. Over-inclusiveness and conceptual 
confusion, suggest these authors, are the source of a lack 
of a rigorous in-depth training amongst psychotherapists in 
any particular viewpoint. Since in-depth knowledge of any 
viewpoint is lacking, the result is an unfortunate urge to 
shift too easily between language systems when trying to 
understand a problem instead of consistently exhausting the 
available possibilities within the original system. Finally, 
104 
suggests Wolmam, the urgent necessity to do something 
in conjunction with the above-mentioned conceptual confusion 
and lack of in-depth training, turns the clinician into 
a hurried handyman whose repair work is not 
based on thorough knowledge, but on the 
necessity to help immediately even if the 
value of the help is dubious. 
(p.20) 
In sum, what we have here is a dismal picture. The dominant 
modus operandi in our science of psychotherapy at the moment 
is based on strawman philsoophical assumptions. At the 
pragmatic level it occurs in response to conceptual confusion 
in the face of a pluralistic science. This results in a lack 
of in-depth theoretical rigour which breeds increased concep-
tual confusion. Unfortunately it is necessary to understand 
the rapid increase in eclectic practice during the last 
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20 years in the light of this negative self-perpetuating cycle. 
So shallow is the level of theoretical sophistication it seems 
that such obvious mutually destructive contradictions as the 
symptom versus non-symptom orientations of behaviour therapy 
and psychoanalysis elaborated on in Section 2, appear _to be 
completely overlooked. Garfield (1976,. pp.79-80) has noted 
with surprise that a large majority of his eclectic respon~ 
dents utilized a combination of psychoanalytic and behavioural 
orientations •although they appear to be diametrically opposed'. 
There is no doubt that eclecticism has become a dangerous 
raidon d'etre for haphazard and theoretically unsound work. 
Ironically it has developed far out of the theoretical bounds 
envisaged by behaviour therapist Lazarus, who coined the term 
'technical eclecticism' (1967) and in so doing provided much 
impetus to the movement. Lazarus at present promotes a highly 
systematized multimodal therapy with a set combination of 
techniques taken largely from behaviour therapy with the 
addition of a complementary biological (medication) dimension. 
There are in fact minimal differences between·Lazarus' multi-
modal therapy and behaviour therapy (Wilson, 1982). Lazarus 
himself is avidly opposed to 'volatile blends' and 'over-
inclusive amalgums' (1977, p.553). He is also quite defin-
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itely opposed to the integration of psychoanalysis and behaviour 
therapy (Lazarus, 1981, cited:.in Wilson, 1982). The analogy 
withmedical science works well for the restricted eclecticism 
of Lazarus since his combination of techniques is taken largely 
from a single main theoretical orientation (i.e., a broad-
based behaviourism). Strictly speaking, Lazarus should exempt 
himself from the label eclectic in terms of the way we have 
defined it here. For him, 'complete unity between a systematic 
theory of personality and an effective method of treatment 
remain a cherished ideal.' (1967, p.416). It is evident that 
eclecticism as it proliferates at present is far-removed from 
Lazarus' ideal. 
There is no doubt that the severe compromise that has occurred 
with regard to the cherished ideal of a unity between system-
atized theory and method in the form of eclecticism is seriously 
endangering psychotherapy with regard to COMPETENCE. The 
latter is the first. and primary item on a code of ethics for 
a profession that serves the public (Downie, 1980). Without 
competence, in other words, we have no claim to the fundamentals 
107 
of an ethical profession. As to why the lack of systematized 
theory in eclecticism is so detrimental to competence in 
psychotherapy, has become very clear from the perspective of 
complementarity. We can sum this up in the following way. 
Firstly, the highly individualistic stance of eclecticism 
with its infinite number of idiosyncratic variations, moti-
vates strongly against the requirement of complementarity of 
unambiguous definitions of operations. Eclecticism does not 
even attempt to connect its sets of operations with a theor-
etical position. Complementarity is well supported in its 
critique of such an individualistic, a-theoretical stance, 
and in the stress it lays on the need for clearly defined 
theoretical orientations that inform action for normal pro-
gress in science (Holt, 1962; Maultsby, 1968; Kuhn, 1970; 
Winch, 1976). Secondly, the haphazard combination of approaches 
without regard for fundamental contradictions as practised by 
the eclectics, is also untenable in terms of complementarity. 
The complementarity principle for practice as we know is against 
the simultaneous use of theoretical arrangements because of 
their mutually destructive properties. Here also we note in 
the literature a growing support for the complementarity stance 
(Siegler, 1966; Marks and Gelder, 1966; Maultsby, 1968; 
Mueller, 1979; Chessick, 1980). I~ general there is a rising 
climate of concern and dissatisfaction with prevailing ec-
lectic practice and its contribution to confusion and incomp-
etence in the science (Chessick, 1977; Ellis, 1982; Garfield, 
1982; Goldfried, 1982; Kendall, 1982). 
Now the serious trap that psychotherapy finds itself in at the 
moment is as follows. The eclect_ic philosophy which we will 
denote (E), was introduced as a means to increase competent 
practice (P) in the face of a pluralistic science (t1 --- tn_)-. 
It transpires, however, that it in itself is a serious cause 
of incompetence, the very problem it is trying to circumvent. 
Because eclecticism is the only unifying epistemology in formal 
use at the moment to bridge the gap between multiple unrelated 
theories (t 1 --- tn) and practice (P), the choice seems to 
be betw~en two e~ils. Stay with eclecticism or go back to 
a limited sectarian approach which may deprive the patient 
of treatments which are potentially beneficial to him. The 
way out of this trap, it is suggested, is via the introduction 
.of a new u~ifying epistemology to guide practice,. that of com-
plementarity (C). These alternatives are schematized in 
Figures 5 and 6, ·p.109. 
Complementarity starts with the same basic motivation as ec-
lecticism, the use of diverse approaches to maximally benefit 
from the contributions of a pluralistic science. Due to its 
postulates of unamb~guous theoretical descriptions, and non-
I 
simultaneous use of contradictory approaches however, it 
should not have the same negative effects. 
It remains to be seen how complementarity can be operation-
alized into practice. 
3.5 THERAPEUTIC COMPLEMENTARITY 
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Diverse Theories 
ECLECTIC FLOWCHART FOR PRACTICE 
THE ECLECTIC EPISTEMOLOGY (E) SERVES AS AN 
EXPLANATORY SYSTEM FOR DIVERSE THEORIES 
(t1 · ... tn). ITS EPISTEMOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES 
IMPLY PRINCIPLES FOR PRACTICE (P) 
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COMPLEMENTARITY FLOWCHART FOR PRACTICE 
THE COMPLEMENTARITY EPISTEMOLOGY (C) SERVES AS AN 
EXPLANATION FOR DIVERSE THEORIES (t1 ••• tn). ITS 
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identified, given a title and introduced as a formal approach 
in practice for the first time by this thesis. It is beyond 
the scope of the pr~s~nt work to do mo~e than give examples 
of how this mode occurs in the field, and to provide tentative 
introductory suggestions of how it can be further developed. 
Therapeutic complementarity is defined as the use of diverse 
approaches to psychotherapy in a theoretically distinct way, 
with a particular concern not to set up against one another 
mutually destructive principles. It has in common with 
'integration' and 'eclecticism' the notion of bringing to-
gether diverse approaches in order to make maximum use of the 
various contributions to the understanding,and treatment of 
~-~--
a patient's problem. It is differentiated from these two 
approaches in that, unlike integration, it does not imply a 
blending together of modes but rather wishes to maximize the 
potential of differences; unlike eclecticism it does not 
imply the simultaneous application of diverse approaches with 
no concern for the consequences of mixing diametrically opp-
osed principles. Therapeutic complementarity is not formally 
recognized at present as a global option for practice~ 
-"\ 
We have surmized from Jung 1 ,S hints and general philosophical 
-:, ....... _ 
standpoint that this is the approach he adopts for psycho-
therapy. Chessick (1977), it seems, is the only one to have 
specifically recommended the complementarity philosophical 
standpoint as a suitable alternative for psychotherapy. His 
article, however, appears to be an unelaborated flash in the 
pan and has not even been mentioned in the extensive review 
series of Garfield, Goldfried, Kendall and Wachtel (1982), on 
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psychotherapy rapprochement. There are trends in psychotherapy 
practice, however, than can usefully be differentiated from 
the alternatives of integration and eclect~cism, and grouped 
together under the rubric of therapeutic complementarity. 
This is a move which is considered imperative due to the dead-
end effects of integration and the extremely negative effects 
of eclecticism as indicated in the previous sub-sections. 
Pragmatic developments in. line with complementarity will be 
discussed urider the sub-headings of (1) case management, 
(2) therapeutic practice, and ·(3) training and research indi-
cations. 
3. 5. 1 Case Management 
As a first step it is necessary to make a distinction between 
•case management• and 'therapeutic practice•. 'Therapeutic 
practice' is the actual execution. of a choice of-psychotherapy 
approaches; •case management• is the step that precedes 
and dictates that choice. The reason for making this dis-
tinction is as follows. 
It is understood within the complementarity framework as we 
know, that there are diverse theoretical options for practice, 
and that the benefits of diverse options must be made use of 
as much as possible. In order to do this, it is necessary 
to keep the options as open and available as possible. At 
the same time, however, we also claim from the complementarity 
perspective that a problem can only be treated and understood 
in terms of a particular theoretical orientation. And as; soon 
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as one theoretical view is adopted it automatically excludes 
other views. The nett result of this is that it is not 
possible to adopt one of the available theoret·ical systems 
of psychotherapy in order to make a general·unbiased initial 
assessment of the problem. Any single orientation adopted 
will skew the understanding of the problem.in the direction 
of the orientation chosen and other choices will not be left 
suitably open. 
Now this without doubt constitutes the horns of a logical 
dilemma. How does one at the assessment stage, maintain an 
open choice between theories ·to subsequently treat a problem, 
when one cannot understand the problem in the first place 
without a prior choice of theory? There are no easy sol-
'· 
utions to this difficult problem. However, alongside the 
growing dissatisfact~on with the haphazard approach of eclec-
ticism there are indications that this dilemma is being 
addressed in the literature. 
9nger (1982), curtis (1982) and Abroms (1983) have made a 
start by addressing the issue of pluralism in psychotherapy 
and problems at the diagnostic/initial assessment level. All 
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three of these authors express their discontent with eclecticism 
and acknowledge (as eclecticism does not) differential theor-
etical causation as a management problem. None of them however 
proceed very far in resolving the problem in a manner satis-
factory to complementarity. The biopsychosocial psychiatric 
serialism advocated by Abroms does not provide us with any 
indication of how to make an initial assessment without using 
existing theories within each of these three broad systems, 
the biological, social and psychological. Unger, as mentioned 
before under Section 3.3.2, tries to get arourid the problem 
of multiple diverse diagnoses by introducing yet another new 
set of theoretical assumptions on which to base a diagnosis 
(his theory of the passions) and in so doing, defeats his own 
' 
purpose. Curtis (p.1239) comes the closest by recognizing the 
need to find a "generic common denominator" for assessment 
purposes, in order to link personality theories and the prac-
tice of psychotherapy. He also falls into the trap, however, 
of producing a common denominator which on examination is a 
mixture of theories. 
It is possible to offer some tentative proposals for a solution 
to this dilemma informed by complementarity. ·what is proposed 
is an assessment procedure that is a~theoretical in the 
sense that it makes no prior assumptions at any level about 
the nature of the problem, and attempts no explanation of 
the problem which can inform treatment. Such a system would 
have no theoretical axe to grind in terms of any choice of 
subsequent treatment programmes.· And if we refer to our 
definitions of theory versus classification in the Introduction 
(p. 8 ), it is evident that classification rather than theory 
is the ideal organizing principle to use at this initial 
assessment stage. 
A recent publication, 'Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders' (DSM-III), 1980, suggests itself as the best 
available classificatory system for our purposes. It was 
developed by the American Psychiatric Association in reaction 
to ~ previous classificatory system, the International 
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Classification of Diseases (I.C.D.9, 1978), which was not 
considered sufficiently symptom specific, and was still based 
on theoretical notions-to some extent. (For example, the 
I.C.D.9 includes the theoretical dimensions of psychotic and 
neurotic, and includes the psychodynamic notion of a loss 
experience as part of the diagnostic criteria for depression) . 
The central feature of the DSM-III on the other hand, is its 
endeavour to be as a-theoretical as possible, and group its 
diagnostic categories purely on the basis of clusters of -
presenting signs and symptoms. 
A major criticism of classificatory systems has been their 
potential danger for labelling and ignoring individuality. 
The DSM-III, however, redresses this problem by means of its 
multi-axial approach to diagnosis. In this approach, a diag-
nosis has to be made on each of the five different dimensions 
of: clinical syndromes, personality disorders, physical dis-
orders, psychosocial stressors and level of pre-morbid adap~ 
tive functioning. And more than one diagnosis can be made 
within the first four of these axes. Two patients, for 
example, may obtain the same diagnosis of 'Alcohol Abuse' 
under clinical syndromes. One may have the additional diag-
noses of anxiety disorder and an organic disorder, whereas 
the other patient may have additional diagnoses of an anti-
social personality disorder and psychosocial stress from a 
family problem. The first patient's diagnosis indicates the 
need for supportive, non-confrontational individual psycho-
therapy to deal with the anxiety disorder, and drugs for the 
organic problem •. The second patient's problems on the other 
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hand, indicate the need for confrontational group therapy to 
remediate the personality disorder, and. family therapy. Having 
received a set of preliminary diagnostic decisions in this 
way based on a system.which aims to·be·as non-theroetically 
biased as possible (in the sense· of an non-explanatory as 
possible), a patient can then be referred on for specialized 
treatment assessments within a. chosen range of relevant 
theoretical approaches. 
A case manager working from the perspective of complementarity 
would be first and foremost a good diagnostician in terms 
of a system such as the DSM-III (i.e. be able to elicit the 
relevant broad range of signs and symptoms). His other 
primary function will be to match diagnoses to the best avail-
able set of treatment procedures and act as a referral agent. 
He should have at his finger'"'"tips, therefore, a knowledge from 
the literature of the types of disorder in terms of his 
classificatory sytem, that are found to respond best to 
particular therapeutic treatments. For example, phobic anxiety 
reportedly responds well to the behavioural treatment of 
systematic desensitization (Wolpe, 1973), and the impulsive, 
acting out borderline personality disorder responds to a 
combination of confrontation, limit-setting and in-depth 
psychodynamic interpretation (Kernberg, 1975; Masterson, 1976, 
in Macaskill, 1982). This case manager in addition should be 
familiar with material from authors such as Clarkin et al 
(1982) and Bloch (1978) on selection criteria for the psycho-
therapies, and with work that focusses on ways of potentiating 
psychotherapeutic efficiency such as matching treatment type· 
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to patient type, or therapist personality type to patient 
type (Kessel and McBrearty, 1967; Witzig, 1978). 
Due to the fact that the initial assessment procedure is 
governed by a particular set of rules which are different to 
those employed by the various therapeutic orientations it 
should ideally be undertaken by a separate specialist. How-
ever, since this is unlikely to be a practical alternative, 
both phases of the procedure could be managed by one clinician 
pro~ided he clearly separates the initial assessment phase 
from the treatment phase. This separation of activities 
can be made apparent to the patient by the therapist's pro-
vision of an outline of his procedure at each stage. Epstein 
and Bishop (1981) refer to this process as 'orientation•. 
Not everyone would agree with the use of a psychiatric 
classification system as a foundation for decis~ons regarding 
therapeutic management. For example, theorists of a more 
phenomenological or humanistic persuasion such as Carl Rogers 
would argue that diagnostic categorization is not required 
in person-centred therapy. In fact Rogers would claim that 
the categorization of the patient would be counter-productive 
to the therapy. It is necessary to stress that such arguments 
arise from within the perspective of particular psychological 
theories, and the whole basis for what is being proposed here 
(cf p. 113) rests on the attempt to provide an extra-theoretical 
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position at the level of case management. This in no way denies 
the necessity for theories of patient functioning in order to 
carry out effective treatment. It is simply that complementarity 
argues that these psychological positions are relative and 
not final and therefore cannot be used for the initial ass-
essment. 
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A different form of opposition to the use of a psychiatric 
system in psychological helping would come from the anti-
psychiatry group as exemplified by Sz.asz (1974). The objections 
of this group emerge from direct opposition to medically orien-
ted frameworks as suppliers of both systems of understanding 
of psychological distress and systems of remediation. Szasz' 
main criticism is that a classification system inevitably 
removes agency from the patient thereby leading to social de-
gradation through his being treated as an object. He suggests 
that classification of the individual should be replaced by 
classifiction of expert services that might be offered to 
individuals in distress. However, this is a radical argument 
in order to save the autonomy of the individual, and it is 
difficult to envisage a system which.does not link the problem 
to the resource. Therefore some form of classification of the 
problem seems inevitable. The case management system proposed 
here, which envisages unbiased expert-based helping systems 
and information in the form of orientation for the client, 
does not appear to contradict Szasz' aim to protect individual 
autonomy. The only exception to this would be the legal removal 
of autonomy through certification. 
In sum, from the perspective of complementarity it is necessary 
to keep theoretical options as unbiased and open as possible 
at the initial assessment level. The adoption of any one of 
the theoretical orinetations at this stage of the proceedings, 
will bias the setting up of other possible orientations. 
An a-theoretical (classificatory) initial interview procedure 
is suggested therefore, by a specialist in psychodiagnostic 
skills and a specialist in knowledge of what different 
available treatment procedures have to offer. From an ethical 
point of view (Steere, 1983), the client should then be in-
formed of the possible alternatives available to him and of 
their potential negative and positive effects. The educated 
patient particularly is in a position to assist with the choice 
of his own treatment. As Jung (1935) writes: 
In the case of educated people •.. I advise 
them to read a bit of Freud and a bit of 
Adler. As a rule they soon find out which 
of the two suits them best. 
(para. 24) 
Kovel's (1976) guide to therapy is the type of handbook which 
could help a patient, in conjunction with guidance from 
his complementarity case manager, to take part in a maximally 
informed, unbiased, and therefore ethical choice with regard 
to his own treatment. 
3.5.2 Therapeutic Practice 
The practice of psychotherapy in terms of complementarity 
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must adhere to the principles of (1) the use of multiple theories, 
and (2) the execution of diverse approaches in a way that 
avoids the destructive potential of contradictory theoretical 
assumptions. 
The notion of complementarity in practice can be conceptualized 
more easily if one considers interdisciplinary complementarity. 
For example, a single person may receive speech therapy for 
a stutter, physioth~rapy fo~ a postural problem and psycho-
therapy for depression. These could be administered in 
parallel (concurrently) over the same period of time, or one 
after the other (sequentially) over separate periods of time. 
Each would be administered by a separate specialist within the 
different disciplines, and obviously kept separate in this 
way, would complement rather than be destructive to each 
other in execution. The literature reflects positive effects 
of such interdisciplinary programmes (Butany and Persad, 1982; 
Follick and Ahern, 1982; Sledge, 1982). 
The term eclectic is used in the literature, it seems, even 
with reference to such a separated multimodal interdisciplinary 
approach as described above (Burke, 1971). Because of the 
totally separate identities and execution of each of these 
modes, however, (they are not a bit of speech therapy, a bit 
of_physiotherapy and a bit of psychotherapy all mixed up 
together and administered at once)', they do not fit approp-
riately under the rubric of ecle~ticism. They deserve a place 
rather under the more dignified term of interdisciplinary 
complementarity. 
It is possible now to transfer the complementarity concept we 
have illustrated with interdisciplinary practice, to comple-
mentarity as it occurs within a single discipline, that of 
psychotherapy practice. Each approach to psychotherapy 
should be viewed as a separate mini-discipline, and given the 
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same separate identity, status and respect to which separate 
disciplines are entitled. From the perspective of comple-
mentarity, we know that ,the~ contradictions between theoretical 
approaches do not represent real contradictions in the etiology 
and cure of the patient's problem. They are simply different 
contributory aspects to the understanding of the problem. 
The contradictions lie in the theoretical structures them-
selves. Therefore, as long as the theories are not executed 
in such a way as to destroy each other (i.e., all mixed up 
together) they should be able to be used beneficially on 
the same person over the same period of time. As illustrated 
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in the interdisciplinary example above, this type of practice 
can be achieved in two ways. Different specialists can conduct 
a number of approaches in parallel at the same period of time 
(parallel complementarity), or one after the other, sequentially, 
over a longer period of time (sequential complementarity) . 
Ideally, in terms of complementarity, the different approaches 
should always be executed by different therapists. One 
therapeutic set of rules with the patient has the potential 
of interfering with an alternative set when they are executed 
by the same therapist. This is particularly the case when the 
therapist is an intrinsic part of the theoretical arrangement 
such as in psychodynamic psychotherapy where the transference 
relationship forms the major vehicle for change. The problem 
is also likely to occur when moving from individual to group 
or family approaches. The alliance formed in an individual 
approach may affect the balance of alliances in group or family 
therapy involving the same individual. 
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The problem of interference is more easily managed in sequen-
tial than in parall~l psychotherapy becuase new contracts can 
be carefully renegotiated before embarking on the next approach, 
and transference issues.can be worked through. In addition, 
it is possible to plan therapeutic programmes which take inter-
ference effects into account. For example, an individual 
approach consequent on a group approach will not produce the 
imbalance of alliances one would expect from the opposite 
arrangement (long-term individualpsychoth~rapyfollowed by 
group work) . As long as new frameworks are clearly negotiated 
with the patient, and therapeutic sequences are carefully 
planned, it is possible to include the option of sequential 
psychotherapy with the same therapist in our complementarity 
programme. This is a necessary step because the ideal of 
different therapists is not always possible in terms of 
practical resources. A major negative aspect of this opinion, 
apart from the need to guard against the interference effects, 
is the fact that the therapist who uses more than one approach 
runs the risk of lacking sufficient depth of knowledge and 
skill in any particular approach.' 
Ideally in terms of complementarity also, the combined input 
of more than one approach is considered to be the most 
beneficial. Availability of finance, time and therapeutic 
resources, however, may once again make this option impossible 
from a practical point of view. In addition, a very circum-
scribed problem (for example, a phobia clearly related to an 
association with a traumatic event, ora clear-cut discipline 
problem in a family) may actually call for a single treatment 
approach. For these reasons, we include under our comple~ 
mentarity programme ·the compromise alternative of a single 
pure approach in preference to an ad hoc mixture of approaches 
when resources are limited, or as·the treqtment of choice for 
a circumscribed problem. 
The possibilities presented here are clearly hypothetical and 
have yet to be empirically verified. The three alternatives 
proposed for therapeutic complementarity are summarized in 
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Table 3, p. 123. It is possible now to examine the psychothe~apy 
literature for indications that are commensurate with this 
pluralistic, yet anti-eclectic, specialist approach. In terms 
of the complementarity hypothesis, apparently contradictory 
approaches administered in the parallel or sequential manner 
as outlined here, should be beneficial to the patient, and 
should not exhibit mutually destructive effects. The examples 
,isolated from the literature will not of course have been 
previously identified as belonging to the non-eclectic mode of 
the newly defined terminology. 
A case-study by Lambley (1976) for example, deserves the label 
of sequential complementarity rather than eclectic therapy. 
Its concern is with the benefits of the separate and sequential 
use of, first, behaviour therapy and second, psychodynamic 
therapy in the treatment of migraine headaches. Lambley 
argues that treatment succeeded because effects gained at the 
behavioural level (assertive training), could be built on and 
supported by subsequent modifications made at the psychodynamic 
level. Llewelyn (1980) similarly describes the effective treat-












MODE OF EXECUTION 
Two or more approaches admini-
stered by different therapists 
during the same period of .time. 
Two or more approaches admini-
stered by the same (or ideally 
different therapists) one after 
the other over separate periods 
of time. 
,A single approach is chosen to 
be administered in a pure way in 
preference to an ad hoc mixture 
of approaches when specialist 
resources are limited. 
It is the treatment of choice for 
a circumscribed problem-
TABLE 3 : THERAPEUTIC COMPLEMENTARITY 
(A mode that promotes a plurality 
of approaches in combination with 
a primary requirement of separate, 
specialist practice) 
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removal of the crippling phobia via systematic desensitization, 
Llewelyn argues, opened the way for the possibility of psycho-
dynamic therapy. Prior to the desensitization an overpowering 
need to talk about the symptom had formed an impenetrable 
resistance in this patient to the exploration of underlying 
emotional conflicts. 
A comparison of two reports by Woody (1968 and 1973) suggest 
that he has evolved from a haphazard mixing together of 
psychodynamic and behavioural therapies in true eclectic style 
(1968) to the concurrent use of these two approaches by 
different specialist therapists in the style which we have 
called parallel complementarity (1973). Woody has even drawn 
up a table which lists the complementary contributions of 
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the two approaches. Segraves and Smith (1976) have come closest 
to the research concerns of complementarity. As pointed out 
previously, the question of the way in which different approaches 
are combined is almost invariably ignored as an issue. 
Segraves and Smith, however, have conducted a study which 
examines the consequences of the parallel use of psychodynamic 
and behaviour therapies over the same period of time with 
separate therapists. They concluded from three case studies 
that such a combination was successful. The two treatment 
regimes had synergistic effects and the anticipated diffi-:-
culties of a split in the therapeutic alliance, symptom subs-
tituti6n, and precipitous withdrawal from psychotherapy 
after symptom removal, did not occur. From the deductions 
arrived at via the epistemological principles of complemen-
tarity, these findings do not come as a surprise. Approaches 
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will not be mutually destructive to each other as long as 
they are kept pure and distinct. 
Rossman (1976) describes the successful use of both sequential 
and parallel therapy in a hospital regime which treats 
disruptive adolescents. This combined sequential and parallel 
therapeutic approach is being used for the hospital treatment 
of other psychiatric syndromes as well, such as anorexia nervosa. 
(Blinder et al, 1970, cited in Rossman, 1976). Essentially 
the behavioural techniques are used to help the patient reach 
a stage of treatment where the symptom is sufficiently under 
control to allow the formation of the relationship necessary 
for psy9hodynamic therapy to take place. Behavioural techniques 
are then continued in parallel with psychodynamic psycho-
therapy. For example, an anorexic patient may belong to an 
eating disorders group which focusses behaviourally on the 
anorexic symptomatology, whilst at the same time undergo 
individual psychodynamic psychotherapy which specifically 
evades symptom-oriented discussion in order to uncover under-
lying repressed emotions. 
The problem with all these trends that are emerging in the 
direction of therapeutic complementarity, is that they are 
not united at present in a superordinate metatheoretical scheme. 
This makes their emergence haphazard and less forceful than 
it should be. It places this mode of therapeutic functioning 
\ 
potentially at risk. Firstly, it may be discounted as falling 
under the rubric of 'ecle~ticism' with all its negative con-
sequences. Secondly, in the absence of a unifying conceptual 
scheme to explain and guide their actions, individual therapists 
may all too easily slip into mixing their models. -They have 
no understanding of _the mutually destructive consequences of 
such a lack of purity and no insight into the potential power 
of the specialist practice of the complementarity system in 
which they are participating. 
As frequently noted, the only two authors in the psychological. 
literature who have explicitly suggested the relevance of 
complementarity for .psychology are Jung and Chessick. This 
sub-section would not be complete, therefore, without checking 
on any indications they may provide for psychotherapy practice. 
Chessick, as mentioned before, does not elaborate on specific 
practical implications, but leaves us with the very general 
statement that different orientations are not fundamentally 
opposed and therefore "may be used successfully to complement 
each other providing the therapist is fully aware of when and 
why he is using each complementary map" (1977, p.255). 
The indications from Jung are more specific but have to be 
extricated carefully from his rather confusing use of the term 
'theory'. Jung suffered a strong reaction against the dogmatic 
and sectarian approach of Freud, and in his writings is at 
pains to reject what he terms 'general theories' which do 
not take the individual into account. What Jung means by 
this and wishes to reject, are fixed theories about the content 
of dream symbols and the specific origins of psychopathology 
which Freud lays down as identical for all people. Jung does 
not, however, reject theory at all in the broad sense of the 
word (cf. definition on p.8). In accordance with the frame-
work of complementarity he considers its role in psychotherapy 
126 
as fundamental. This is evident in the following q~otations: 
•.. we always need some theory to make 
things intelligible. It is on the basis 
of theory, for instance, that I expect dreams 
to have meaning ... I have to make this 
hypothesis to find the courage to deal with 
dreams at all. 
(1931, para.318) 
For dream analysis is not just the 
practical application of a method that can 
be learnt mechanically; it presupposes 
a familiarity with the whole analytical 
point of view, 
(1948, para.498) 
In the quotations above; there is a definite statement from 
Jung of the necessity for theory. In addition he makes it 
\ 
clear, in accordance with complementarity, that it is not 
possible to separate techniques from the fundamental theoretical 
underpinnings on which they are inevitably built. And in the 
quotation to follow, there is a suggestion from Jung which is 
pluralistic, anti-eclectic, and in terms of the programme 
outlined in this sub-section, quite clearly in the camp of 
therapeutic complementarity. 
The severer neuroses usually require 
a reductive analysis of their symptoms 
and states. And here one should not apply 
this or that method indiscriminately, but 
according to the nature of the case, should 
conduct the analysis more along the lines 
of Freud or more along those of Adler. 
(1935, para.24) 
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In sum, this subsection has specified the components of the 
complementarity mode of therapeutic practice. From as far 
back as Jung it is possible to locate suggestions of its 
presence in the literature. Until now, however, it has not 
been united under a guiding metatheoretical structure. 
3.5.3 Training and Research Indications 
Complementarity, as seen from the previous two sub-sections, 
poses a global model for practice that demands a high degree 
of theoretical knowledge and specialization. Training and 1 
research into psychotherapy form the essential feedback loops 
that serve to inform this type of specialist practice. They 
must also be pursued, therefore, in a way which promotes 
differentiation and specialization. Once again, in both these 
areas, it is possible to detect an anti-eclectic trend in the 
literature. 
Bishop et al (in press), writing from the perspective of family 
therapy, suggest that training within this field should focus 
on one theoretical approach. Exposing beginners to multiple 
modes, they maintain, often confuses them and conveys the idea 
that family work is "a bit of this and a bit of that". Beal 
(1980), also with respect to family therapy, advocates the 
need to strive for clarity in theoretical understanding and 
training within a particular orientation. He states as follows: 
In an era where eclecticism proliferates •.• 
a major difficulty for all trainees occurs 
when they attempt to think about families 
from an intrapsychic, interpersonal, or 
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systems viewpoint or from all viewpoints 
simultaneously. It is difficult enough to 
recognize emotional process, it is infinitely 
more complex for the new trainee when he or 
she is confronted with several viewpoints 
and theories about emotional process. 
(p.262) 
It is possible to enlarge on what Beal is saying to include 
all the modes of psychotherapy in addition to family therapy 
(i.e. group, individual. and marital therapies), each in turn 
with their different within-mode theoretical orientations. 
The result is the chaotic and confused situation of about 150-
200 ch6ices of approach for the trainee, which is the problem-
atic point at which this thesis began. 
From the conceptual framework of complementarity it is possible 
to make some preliminary suggestions for the training of 
psychotherapists. The eclectic mode of a cursory training in 
the use of as many approaches as possible, or a mixture of 
approaches, is considered inappropriate. Complementarity 
. 
promotes specialized in-depth training in a very limited number 
of orientations within a larger metatheoretical framework which 
' 
accepts the potential contribution of multiple approaches. 
A suitable beginner's training for example would be practical 
exposure to a single theoret~cal orientation from each of the 
following four major complementary modes: family (including 
marital), group, individual behavioural and individual psycho-
dynamic. The rationale behind this choice is to give the 
practitioner a potential repertoire of each mode of therapy, 
as well as an approach from each side of the fundamental 
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dialectical/demonstrative poles (i.e., behavioural and 
psychodynamic). In this way a therapist would be equipped 
to conduct sequential therapy if necessary in a limited range 
of approaches from the major therapeutic modes. At a later 
stage, the trainee should ideally choose to specialize in 
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one approach exclusively, or in one theoretical orientation 
which he can apply in different modes (for example, a psycho-
dynamic orientation applied to individuals, families and groups). 
It is only by means of in-depth traininginthis way that 
the field will produce practitioners who can make use of the 
full range and convenience of individual approaches, and there-
by produce a competent and ethical service. 
If we turn now to the area of research, it is possible to 
find here also a growing dissatisfaction with conceptual loose-
ness and a trend towards complementarity. Recent reviews on 
research into psychotherapy draw attention to the extreme 
complexity of this research because of multiple intervening 
and uncontrollable variables (Bergin, 1967; Bednar and Kaul, 
1979; Shapiro, 1980). These authors suggest that outcome 
measures are virtually meaningless unless they are in combin-
ation with clearly delineated procedures which in turn are 
embedded in an integrated theoretical rationale. 
The kind of research endeavour that exemplifies these authors' 
criticisms, is the meaningless type of outcome study mentioneq 
earlier where a term such as 'eclectic' is used as an 
independent variable with no specific elaboration of what this 
means with regard to procedure (Koss, 1983; Cohen, 1981). 
Shapiro and Bergin suggest that it is high time to supersed~ 
such crude global comparisons with precise specifications 
of interventions, and detailed process analyses which can be 
linked to meaningful outcome measures. 
More specifically, the kinds of research strategies that 
Shapiro suggests are summarized as follows: 
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(1) Single-case experiments directed towards the identification 
'of relatively short-term· responses to specific treatment 
interventions. 
(2) Between-group comparisons in which specific treatment 
elements are experimentally manipulated. 
(3) Process studies identifying causal relationships within 
the therapeutic transaction. 
(4) Longer-term outcome studies of well-researched method-
ological packages. 
The longer term outcome study, according to Shapiro, belongs 
relatively late in the evolution of research on a given 
treatment mode. It depends on the prior development of an 
unambiguous, clearly defined method grounded in systematic 
theory which is obtained via single case studies, and· studi·es 
which manipulate specific treatment variables. 
It is evident that the message from these authors with regard 
to psychotherapy research is in line with epistemological 
indications from complementarity. This highly complex, 
potentially ambig·uous endeavour must be made as unambiguous 
as possible by means of the development of clearly delineated 
methods and rationales. Such research will have the potential 
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to detect potent differences between approaches which can feed 
back to the case management level. This in turn will enhance 
the effectiVeness of the various specialist practices and 
training in .the total system of therapeutic complementarity 
(see Figure 7, p.133). 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
It is evident that the feedback loop of therapeutic comple-
mentarity works at all levels (case management, therapy 
practice, research and training), towards conceptual and method-
ological tightening both within and between therapy approaches. 
This is in opposition to the feedback loop of eclecticism, 
which starts with conceptual confusion and breeds further 
confusion. By means of complementarity, therefore, it is 
possible to break out of the negative cycle and produce a 
more ordered, effective, and therefore ethical science. 
This newly delineated system provides the basis for empirical 
research. The type of research envisaged involves the analysis 
' 
of process changes to identify differences between the execution 
of eclectic therapy and the variety of combinations suggested 
by complementarity. A further research possibility would in-
volve a survey of practicing psychotherapists to establish 
the degree to which their functioning reflects either an 
eclectic or complementarity approach. This is necessary to 
establish the extent to which.those therapists designated 
"eclectic" (Garfield, 1976), are in fact moving to the approach 
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Finally, there are emergent trends in the literature which 
are in line with the proposed system. It is imperative that 
these trends be given recognition as a development in their 
own right and that they be differentiated fro~ integration, 
and most particularly from eclecticism. Therapeutic comple-
m~ntarity combines approaches in a distinctive way that strives 
to maximize the therapeutic power of complementary differences. 
~his is a trend which has roots in dialectical psychological 
theory and in the most recent developments in the philosophy 




Abramowitz, C.M. ··Personalistic psychotherapy and the role of 
technical eclecticism. Psychological Reports, 1970, 
3.§_(1), 255-263. 
Abroms, E.M. Beyond eclecticism. American Journal of Psych-
iatry, 1983, ~, 740-745. 
Adler, G. (ed.), C.G. Jung letters, Vol.2 : 1951-1961. 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975. 
135 
American Psychiatric Association. 
manual of mental disorders. 
Diagnostic and statistical 
Washington, D.C.: A.P.A., 1980. 
Aspect, A., Dalibard, J. and Roger, G. Experimental Test 
of Bell's inequalities using time-varying analyzers. 
Physical Review Letters, 1982, ~(25), 1804-1807. 
Ayer, A.J. Language, truth and logic. Harmondsworth: Pelican 
Books, 1976. 
Bergin, A.E. and Lambert, M.J. The evaluation of therapeutic 
outcomes. In S.A. Garfield and A.E. Bergin (eds.), Hand-
book of psychotherapy and behaviour change. New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1978. 
Bergstein, T. Quantum physics and ord~nary language. London: 
MacMillan, 1972. 
Bishop, M.D., Byles, J. and Horn, D. Family therapy training 
methods: Minimal contact with an agency. Journal of 
Family Therapy, 1984, in press. 
Blackburn, T.R. Sensuous-intellectual complementarity. In 
136 
F.E. Goodson and M.H. Marx (eds.), Theories in contemporary 
psychologx. New York: MacMillan, 1976. (2nd.ed.) 
Bloch, S. Assessment of patients for psychotherapy. British 
Journal of Psxchiatrx, 1979, 135, 193-208. 
Block, N. Philosophy of psychology. In P.D. Asquith and H.E. 
Kyburg (eds.), Current research in philosophy of science. 
East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1979. 
Block, N. What is philosophy of psychology? In N. Block 
(ed.), Readings in philosophx of psychologx, Vol.2. 
London: Methuen, 1981. 
Bohr, N. Atomic theorx and the description of nature. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934. 
Bohr, N. Atomic phxsics and human knowledge. New York: 
Wiley, 1958. 
Boring, E.G. A historx of experimental psxchologx. New York: 
APpleton-Century-Crofts, 1951. 
Bradway, K. and Wheelwright, J. The psychological type of 
the analyst and its relation to analytical practice. 
Journal of Analytical Psychology, 1978, ~, 211-225. 
Brammer, L.M. and Shostrom, E.L. Therapeutic psychology. 
Fundamentals of counselling and psychotherapy. Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1977. 
Burke, A.W. Social and psychiatric problems in day hospital 
management at Hill End. International Journal of Social 
Psychiatry, 1977, ~(2), 103-109. 
Butany, v. and Persad, E. Is stuttering a contradiction to 
psychotherapy? Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 1982, 
~(4), 330-331. 
Chessick, D. Effects of the therapist's philosophical pre-
mises on psychotherapeutic process. American Journal of 
Psychotherapy, 1977, l!(2), 252-264. 
Chessick, R.D. Some philosophical assumptions of intensive 
psychotherapy. American Journal of Psychotherapy, 1980, 
XXXIV, 4, 496-509. 
Chessick, R.D. Current issues in intensive psychotherapy. 
American Journal.of Psychotherapy, 1982, 1.§_(4), ·438-449. 
Clarkin, J.F. and Frances, A.F. Selection criteria for the 
brief psychotherapies. American Journal of Psychotherapy, 
1982, XXXVI, 166-179. 
Cohen, L.H. Clinicians evaluations of psychodynamic psycho-
therapy: Experimental data on psychological peer review. 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1981, 
±2. ( 4) , 583-589. 
137 
Coulson, J. and Carr, C.T. (eds.), The Oxford Illustrated 
Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. 
Coulter, J. Approaches to-insanity. Bath: The Pitman Press, 
1973. 
138 
Curtis, J.M. A linkage theory of personality and psychotherapy. 
Psychological Reports, 1982, ~(3 Pt.2), 1239-1248. 
Davies, P. Other worlds. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980. 
Davis, J.D. Slaying the psychoanalytic dragon: An integra-
tionist 1 s commentary on Yates. British Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, 1983, ~(2), 133-134. 
De Waele, J.P. and Harre, R. The personality of individuals. 
In R. Harre (ed.), Personality. Oxford: Blackwell, 1976. 
Dooley, P.K. Kuhn and psychology. "The Roge.rs-Skinner, Day-
Giorgi debates". Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour, 
1982, ~(3), 275-289. 
Downie, R.S. Words, ethics, morals and moral philosophy. 
Journal of Medical Ethics, 1980, ~(1), 33. 
Ellis, A. Must most psychotherapists remain as incompetent 
as they now are? Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy, 
1 982' .:!2. ( 1) , 7-28. 
Elsasser, W.M. Philosophical dissonances in quantum mechanics. 
In A. Youngler and P. van der M:erwe (eds.), Perspectives 
in Quantum theory. London: M.I.T. Press, 1971. 
Epstein, N.B. and Bishop, D.S. Problem centred systems therapy 
of the family. In A.S. Gurman and D.P. Kniskern (eds.), 
Handbook of family therapy. New York: Brunner/Mazel, 1981. 
Feifel, H. Philosophy reconsidered. Psycho~ogical Reports, 
1964, ~, 415-420. 
Flew, A. A dictionary of philosophy. London: Pan Books, 1979. 
Pollick, M.J. and Ahern, D.K. Outpatient behavioural manage-
ment of chronic pain. Behavioural Medicine Update, 1982, 
1_(4),. 7-10. 
Garfield, S.L. and Kurtz, R. Clinical psychologies in the 
1970's. American Psychologist, 1976, ~, 1-9. 
Garfield, S.L. and Kurtz, R. A study of eclectic views. 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1977, 45 
(1) 1 78-83. 
Garfield, S.L. Eclecticism and integration in psychotherapy. 
Behavior Therapy, 1982, .1l_(5,), 610-673. 
Giorgi, A. Psychology as a human science. New York: Harper 
and Row, 197 0. 
Goldfried, M.R. On the history of therapeutic integration; 
Behaviour Thera£Y, 1982, 1l(5), 572-593. 
Goldfried, M.R. A behaviour therapist looks at rapprochement. 
Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 1983, ~, 97-107. 
Groesbeck, C.J. Psychological types in the analysis of the 
transference. Journal of Analytic Psychology, 1978, ~, 
23-53. 
Harre, R. The philosophies of science: An introductory survey. 
London: Oxford University Press, 1974. 
Harre, R. Social being. Oxford: Blackwell, 1979. 
139 
140 
/ Heaton, J.M. Theory in psychotherapy. InN. Bolton (ed.), 
Philosophical problems in psychology. London: Methuen, 1979. 
Hebb, D.O. What psychology is about? American Psychologist, 
1974, 32_, 71-79. 
Heelan, P.A. Quantum mechanics and objectivity. The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1965. 
Hempel, e.G. Philosophy of natural science. Englewooq Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1966. 
Hitt, W.D~ Two models of man. ~~erican Psychologist, 1969, 
77, 651-657. 
Holt, R.R. Individuality and generalization in the psychology 
of personality. Journal of Personality, 1962, lQ, 
377-404. 
Ingleby, D. Understanding 'mental illness'. In D. Ingleby 
(ed.), Critical psychiatry; the politics of mental 
health. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981. 
Ivey, A.E.and Simek-Downing, L. Counseling and psychotherapy; 
skills, theories and practices. Englewood-Cliffs; N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980. 
i 
Jacobi, J. e.G. Jung: Psychological reflections. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974. 
Jammer, M. The conceptual development of quantum mechanics. 
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. 
Jung, C.G. 
1929. Problems of modern psychotherapy. In C.W.16. 
1931. The Practical use of dream analysis. In C.W.16. 
141 
Jung, C.G. 
1935. Principles of Practical Psychotherapy. In C.W.16. --~ 
1945. On the nature of dreams. In c.w.8. 
1946. Analytical psychology and education. In C.W.17. 
1948. General aspects of dream psychology. In C.W.8. 
1948a. Address on the occasion of the founding of the 
Jung Institute, Zurich. In C.W.18. 
1952. Synchronicity: An acausal connecting principle. ~-
-/ 
In c.w.8. 
1954. On the nature of the psyche. In C. W. 8. ~-/ 
Katsoff, L.O. Facts, phenomena, and frames of reference. 
Psychological review, 1953, 60, 40-44. 
Kelly, G.A. The psychology of personal constructs. Volume 1: 
A theory of personality. New York: W.W. Norton, 1955. 
Kendall, P.C. Integration: Behaviour therapy and other schools 
of thought. Behaviour Therapy, 1982, .1_l(5), 559-571. 
Kessel, P. and McBrearty, J.F. Values and psychotherapy. 
Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1967, ~, 669-690. 
Koch, S. Psychology cannot be a coherent science. Psychology 
Today, 1969, l(1), 14. 
Kohler, w. Gestalt psychology today. American Psychologist, 
1959, l!, 727-734. 
Koss, M.P. Outcome of eclectic psychotherapy in private 
psychological practice. American Journal of Psychotherapy, 
1983, 12(3), 400-410. 
Kovel, J. A complete guide to therapy. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books Ltd., 1976. 
142 
Kuhn, T.S. The structure of scientific revolutions. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. 
Kuhn, T.S. The function of dogma in scientific research. 
In B.A. Brody (ed.), Readings in the philosophy of science. 
Englewood-Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970. 
Kukla, A. Logical incoherence of value-free science. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 1982, Q(5), 
1014-1017. 
Lambley, P. Are there more ways than one? Impulse, 1970, lr 
35-38. 
Lambley, 0. A theory of existential psychology. Unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1971. 
Lambley, P. Scientific status of technical eclecticism: 
a critical note. Psychological reports, 1971a, ~, 91-97. 
Lambley, P. The use of assertive training and psychodynamic 
insight in the treatment of migraine headaches: A case 
study. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 1976, 
163, 61-64. 
Lazarus, A.A. In support of technical eclecticism. Psycho-
logical Reports, 1967, ~' 415-41. 
Lazarus, A.A. Scientism and psychotherapy. Psychological 
Reports, 1968, Q(3, Pt.1), 1015-1016. 
Lazarus, A.A. Has behaviour therapy outlived its usefulness? 
American Psychologist, 1977, ~(7), 550-554. 
143 
Levay, A.N., Weissburg, J.H. and Blaustein, A.B. Concurrent 
sex therapyandpsvchoanalytic psychotherapy by separate 
therapists: Effectiveness and implications. Psychiatry, 
1976, ~' 355-363. 
Lerner, R.M. Concepts and theories of human development. 
Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1976. 
Llewelyn, S.P. The uses of an eclectic approach: A case 
study. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 1980, 
~(2) 1 145-149. 
Losee, J. A historical introduction to the philosophy of 
science. London: Oxford University Press, 1972. 
Macaskill, N.D. The theory of transitional phenomena and its 
application to the psychotherapy of the borderline patient. 
British Journal of Medical Psychology, 1982, ~' 349-360. 
Malan, D.H. Individual psychotherapy and the science of 
psychodynamics. London: Butterworth & Co., 1979. 
Marks, I.M. and Gelder, M.G. Common ground between behaviour 
therapy and psychodynamic methods. British Journal of 
Medical Psychology, 1966, ~' 11-23. 
Marshall, E. Psychotherapy works, but for whom? Science, 
1980, 207, 506-508. 
Maultsby, M.C. Against technical eclecticism. Psychological 
Reports, 1968, ~' 926-928. 
Mehra, J. The quantum principle! Its in~erpretation and epis-
temology. New York: D. Reidel, 1974. 
Merri~m-Webster, A. Webster's Thesaurus. Springfield Mass-
achusetts: G & C Merriam Co., 1976. 
Mueller, C.G. Some origins of psychology as science. Annual 
ReviewofPsychology, 1979, 30(i), 9-29. 
North, G. The secular priests. London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1972. 
Oppenheim, P. and Brody, N. Application of Bohr's principle 
of complementarity to the mind-body problem .. Journal of 
Philosophy, 1969, ~' 97-113. 
144 
Ornstein, R.E. The psychology of consciousness. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1975. 
Petersen, A. Quantum physics and the philosophical tradition. 
Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T., 1968. 
Piaget, J. Relations between psychology and other sciences. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 1979, lQ_, 1-8. 
Pirsig, R.M. Zen and the art of motor cycle maintenance. 
London: Corgi Books, 1974. 
Powers, J. Philosophy and the new physics. London: Methuen, 
1982. 
Preece, W.E. (ed.),_ Encyclopaedia Britannica. Chicago: 
Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1968. 
Prochaska, J.O. Systems of psychotherapy: A transtheoretical 
analysis. Springfield, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1979. 
Rogers, C.R. On becoming a person. A therapist's view of 
psychotherapy. London: Constable, 1961. 
Rossman, P. and Knesper, D.J. The early phaseofhospital 
treatment for disruptive adolescents: The integration 
of behavioral and dynamic techniques. Journal of the 
Americn Academy of Child Psychiatry, 1976, ..:\2(4), 693-708. 
Rotter, J.B. A historical and theoretical analysis of some 
broad trends in clinical psychology. Ins. Koch (ed.), 
Psychology: A study of a science. Vol.5. 
McGraw Hill, 1963. 
New York: 
Royce, J.R. (ed.), Toward unification in psychology. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1970. 
Russell, B. History of Western philosophy. London: Unwin 
Paperbacks, 1979. 
Rychlak, J.F. A philosophy of science for personality theory. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1968. 
145 
Rychlak, J.F. The human person in modern psychological science. 
British Journal of Medical Psychology, 1970, !l(3), 233-240. 
Rychlak, J.F. Personality and psychotherapy. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1981. 
Rychlak, J.F. Some therapeutic implications of logical phe-
nomenology. Psychotherapy Theory, Research and Practice, 
1982, ..!2_(3) 1 259-265. 
Ryle, A. A common language for the psychotherapies. British 
Journal of Psychiatry, 1978, 132, 585-94. 
Segraves, R.T. and Smith, R.C. Concurrent psychotherapy and 
behaviour therapy. Archives of General Psychiatry, 1976, 
33, 756-763. 
Shapiro, D. Science and psychotherapy: The state of the art. 
British Journal of Medical Psychology, 1980, 53, 1-10. 
,Shetter, J. Images of man in psychological research. London: 
Methuen, 1975. 
Siegel, H. On the parallel between Piagetian cognitive 
development and the history of science. Philosophy of 
Social Science, 1982, ~' 375-386. 
Siegler, M. and Osmond, H. Models of madness. British Journal 
of Psychiatry, 1966, 112, 1193-1203. 
Sledge, W.H. Some general considerations of treatment inte-
gration. Journal of Psychiatric Treatment and Evaluation, 
1982, !(5), 455-457. 
Speake, J. (ed.), A dictionary of philosophy. London: Pan 
Books, 1979. 
Staples, F.R., Sloane, R.B., Whipple, R., Gristol, A.H and 
Yorkston, N. Differences between behaviour therapists 
and psychotherapists. Archives of General Psychiatry, 
1975, ~' 1517-1522. 
Steere, J. Guidelines for the development of an ethical code 
for clinical psychologists in South Africa. Unpublished 
M.Sc. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1983. 
Stiles, W.B. Psychotherapy recapitulates ontogeny: The epi-
genesis of intensive interpersonal relationships. 
Psychotherapy, Theory, Research and Practice, 1979, 
1.§_(4) 1 49-62. 
146 
Strupp, H.H. Psychotherapy, research and practice - an over-
view. In S.L. Garfield and A.E. Be~gin (eds.), Handbook 
of psychotherapy and behavior change. New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, 1978. 
147 
Szasz, T. Ideology and insanity. Essays on the psychiatric 
dehumanization of man. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974. 
Unger, R.M. A program for late twentieth-century psychiatry. 
_American Journ.;:tl of Psychiatry, 1982, 139(1), 155-164. 
Vann Spruiell, M.O. Kuhn's paradigm and psychoanalysis. 
The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 1983, 11(3), 353-362. 
Von Franz, M.L. Science and the unconscious. In e.G. Jung 
Man and his symbols. London: Aldus Books, 1972. 
Von Franz, M.L. Number and time. Reflections heading toward 
a unification of depth psychology and physics. 
Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1976. 
Von Weizsacker, C.F. Classical and quantum descriptions. 
In The physicist's conception of nature. Boston' D. Reidel 
Publishing Co., 1973. 
Wachtel, Paul L. What can dynamic therapies contribute to 
behaviour therapy? Behaviour Therapy, 1982, ll(5), 594-689. 
Wagman, M. Systematic dilemma counseling: Theory, method, 
research. Psychological Reports, 1979, !!(1), 55-72. 
Wertheimer, M. Fundamental issues in psychology. New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972. 
Williams, G. Methodological chauvinism in the philosophy 
of science. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 1983, 
~, 293-297. 
Wilson, S.T. Clinical issues and strategies in the practice 
of behaviour therapy. In C.M. Franks, G.T. Wilson, 
P.G. Kendall and K. Biownell (eds.), Annual review of 
behaviour therapy (Vol.8). New York: Guilford, 1982. 
Winch, P. The idea of a social science. London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1976. 
Witzig, J.S. Jung's typology and classification of the psycho-
therapies. Journal of Analytic Psychology, 1978, 23, 
315-331. 
Wolf, E. Learning theory and psychoanalysis. British Journal 
of Medical Psychology, 1966, 39, 1-10. 
Wollersheim, J.P. The influence of therapy rationales upon 
perceptions of clinical problems. Cognitive Therapy and 
Research, 1982, _§_(2), 167-172. 
148 
Wolman, B.B. Clinical psychology and the philosophy of science. 
In B.B. Wolman (ed.), Handbook of clinical psychology. 
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965. 
Woody, R.H. Toward a rationale for psychobehavioural therapy. 
Archives of General Psychiatry, 1968, .1.2_, 197-2.04. 
Woody, R.H. Psychobehavioural counseling and therapy: 
Integrating behavioural and insight techniques. New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971. 
Woody, R.H. Integrated aversion therapy and psychotherapy: 
two sexual deviation case studies. Journal of Sex Research, 
1973, ~, 313-324. 
Wolpe, J. The practice of behaviour therapy •. London: Pergamon 
Press Inc., 1973. 
World Health Organization. Mental disorders: Glossary and 
guide to their classification in accordance with the 
ninth revision of the International Classification of 
Diseases. Geneva: W.H.O., 1978. 
Yates, A.J. Behaviour therapy: past, present, future -
imperfect? Clinical Psychology Review, 1981, l' 269-291. 
3 1 OCT 1984 
149 
